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CASENOTES
BANKING LAW-Bank Holding Company with Attributes
of Traditional Branch Banking Does Not Violate State
Branching Restrictions. Grandview Bank & Trust Co. v.
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 550 F.2d
415 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 64 (1977).
The demand for banking services in the United States has mush-
roomed since World War II. The emergence of a consumption-oriented
society combined with a proliferation of consumer goods has unleashed a
multibillion dollar demand for consumer credit.' Large scale commercial
and industrial development, coupled with inflation, has generated an
enormous need for new capital. 2 At the same time, rapid suburban
growth and more frenetic lifestyles have necessitated more convenient
banking services. Commercial banks have responded to these needs by
establishing branch banks in many states.3 Despite the enlarged lending
capacity and increased number of bank locations offered by branch
banking, however, a majority of states restrict its use.4 Multibank hold-
1. Consumer loans have more than doubled in the last decade alone, from $76 billion
in 1967 to $199 billion in mid-1977. Bus. WEEK, Sept. 19, 1977, at 2.
2. Commercial and industrial loans have jumped from $64 billion in 1967 to $124
billion in mid-1977. Id.
3. Statewide branching is permitted in the following nineteen states and the District of
Columbia: Alaska, Arizona, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho, Maine,
Maryland, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Oregon, Rhode Island,
South Carolina, South Dakota, Vermont, and Washington. The total number of bank
branches increased from 3,954 in 1945 to 29,795 in 1975. The American Bankers Associa-
tion, State Banking Law Service, 80 (1976). Bankers have also responded to the increased
demand for banking services by offering bank credit cards, automatic bank teller win-
dows, customer bank communication terminals, and automatic bill payment services, and
by establishing correspondent relationships with other banks.
4. Twelve states do not permit any form of branching: Colorado, Illinois, Kansas,
Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Texas, West Vir-
ginia, and Wyoming. Nineteen states have geographic or other restrictions on branching:
Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mas-
sachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Ohio, Pennsylvania,
Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, and Wisconsin. Antibranching laws generally predate the
Depression and reflect state concerns that branching would lead to overbanking and
ruinous competition, jeopardizing the stability of the banking system. More recent opin-
ions indicate that bank safety considerations weigh in favor of branching. Federal Branch-
ing Policy: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Financial Institutions of the Senate Comm.
on Banking, Housing, & Urban Affairs, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 142-43 (1976) (statement of
Larry Mote, staff member, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago) [hereinafter cited as 1976
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ing companies 5 have emerged in these states as alternative vehicles for
satisfying banking needs. 6
While offering services similar to those of branch banks, multibank
holding companies escape automatic condemnation under antibranching
laws by virtue of the separate corporate existence of each bank within
the holding company structure. 7 As multibank holding companies have
intruded into local banking markets, however, independent bankers have
invoked antibranching laws to repel the threatened competition. Pointing
to symbiotic relationships within the holding company systems, they
have claimed that bank holding company operations constitute branch
banking by another name. By declining to endorse this argument, the
decision in Grandview Bank & Trust Co. v. Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System 8 stretched the tension between the expansionary
activities of bank holding companies and the restraints of antibranching
laws to the breaking point.
In March of 1975, Commerce Bancshares, Inc., a Missouri multibank
holding company, 9 sought Federal Reserve Board approval'0 of a pro-
posed acquisition of the Commerce Bank of Grandview, a newly formed
national bank. The Grandview Bank & Trust Co., whose monopoly of
Hearings]. Branching makes it easier for bank regulators to save failing banks. Failures
which do occur are less costly to the FDIC insurance fund in branching states. d. at 125
(statement of Robert Bartell, President, Federal Home Loan Bank of Chicago).
5. A bank holding company (BHC) is defined under the Bank Holding Company Act,
12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-50 (1970), as "any company which has control over any bank." 12
U.S.C. § 1841(a)(1). "Control" exists when a company directly or indirectly has the
power to vote 25% or more of any class of voting securities of a bank, when the company
controls in any manner the election of a majority of the directors or trustees of a bank, or
when the Federal Reserve Board determines that the company directly or indirectly
exercises a controlling influence over the management or policies of a bank. 12 U.S.C.
§ 1841(a)(2). See also 12 C.F.R. § 225.2 (1977).
6. See 1976 Hearings, supra note 4, at 293 (statement of Jerome C. Darnell, Assistant
Professor of Business Administration, University of Colorado). Bankers have also resort-
ed to merger, chain, and affiliate arrangements to circumvent state branching restrictions.
Nevertheless, bank holding companies have been the prevalent means by which bankers
have avoided branching restraints. See Boczar, The Growth of Multibank Holding
Companies: 1956-73, summarized in 62 FED. RES. BULL. 300 (1976). From 1970 through
1974, 60% of all BHC acquisitions of banks were in nonbranching states, 30% were in
limited branching states, and less than 10% were in statewide branching states. 1976
Hearings at 310.
7. See note 28 & accompanying text infra.
8. 550 F.2d 415 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 64 (1977).
9. Commerce Bancshares controlled 31 other bank affiliates in Missouri. 550 F.2d at
417.
10. Under the Bank Holding Company Act, the Federal Reserve Board must approve
all bank holding company formations and acquisitions of affiliate banks. 12 U.S.C. § 1842
(1970).
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banking services in Grandview was threatened by the new bank,I' chal-
lenged the acquisition on the ground that it would violate Missouri's ban
on branch banking.' 2 Grandview alleged that Commerce Bancshares
operated its banking network in a unitary fashion and that the new bank
would be a de facto branch. The Federal Reserve Board rejected the
challenge, finding that the acquired bank would be a separate corpora-
tion independent of the holding company and its other bank sub-
sidiaries. 13 The new bank, it concluded, would not be managed as part of
a "unitary operation" tantamount to branch banking.
The Board's reasoning failed to win complete endorsement on direct
review by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.' 4
The court observed that a commonality of directors and officers within
the Bancshares system, its systemwide training program for bank man-
agers, and its advertising claim to be a "family of banks" all suggested a
de facto unitary banking operation.15 Nevertheless, the court upheld the
acquisition, relying on the legality of multibank holding companies under
the Bank Holding Company Act. 16 Noting congressional awareness of
the similarity between multibank holding companies and branch banking,
the court asserted that disputes over bank holding company operations
are suited for legislative rather than judicial resolution.' 7
I. CONFLICTING FEDERAL POLICIES ON BRANCHING
The tension between bank holding companies and state branching laws
has its genesis in two federal statutes-the McFadden Act 8 and the Bank
11. Grandview Bank & Trust Co. was the only commercial bank in the city of Grand-
view, Missouri, and was a potential competitor of the proposed new bank. Brief for
Respondent at 5, Grandview Bank & Trust Co. v. Board of Governors, 550 F.2d 415 (8th
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 64 (1977).
12. Mo. REV. STAT. § 362.105.1(1) (1969) provides, in pertinent part, that "no bank or
trust company shall maintain in this state a branch bank or trust company, or receive
deposits or pay checks except in its own banking house .... "
13. 62 FED. RES. BULL. 368 (1976), 41 Fed. Reg. 12,093 (1976). The board found that
the new bank would have separate reserve requirements, capital stock, and loan limits;
that its officers and directors would be generally independent of the holding company;
that it would maintain separate account records, issue distinctive checks, and use distinc-
tive stationery; and that money deposited at the acquired bank would remain separate
from accounts at Bancshares' other banks. 62 FED. RES. BULL. at 369-70, 41 Fed. Reg. at
12,093-94.
14. Under § 9 of the Bank Holding Company Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1848 (1970), initial
review of Federal Reserve Board decisions lies with the courts of appeals.
15. 550 F.2d at 419.
16. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-50 (1970).
17. 550 F.2d at 419-20.
18. 12 U.S.C. § 36 (1970) (originally enacted as Act of Feb. 25, 1927, ch. 191, § 7, 44
Stat. 1228).
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Holding Company Act. 9 The former has worked to confine bank expan-
sion while the latter has encouraged and facilitated it. Under the McFad-
den Act, federally chartered banks may operate branches only if state
law permits state chartered banks to do so. 20 A branch is defined to
include "any branch bank, branch office, branch agency, additional
office, or any branch place of business located in any State or Territory
. . . at which deposits are received, or checks paid, or money lent." '21
The purpose of the McFadden Act is to insure "competitive equality" 22
between state and national banks and thereby nourish a vigorous dual
19. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-50 (1970) (originally enacted as Act of May 9, 1956, ch. 240-50, §
2, 70 Stat. 133).
20. The McFadden Act provides, in pertinent part, that
A national banking association may, with the approval of the Comptroller of the
Currency, establish and operate new branches: (1) Within the limits of the city,
town or village in which said association is situated, if such establishment and
operation are at the time expressly authorized to State banks by the law of the
State in question; and (2) at any point within the State in which said association is
situated, if such establishment and operation are at the same time authorized to
State banks by the statute law of the State in question by language specifically
granting such authority affirmatively and not merely by implication or recogni-
tion, and subject to the restrictions as to location imposed by the law of the State
on State banks.
12 U.S.C. § 36(c) (1970).
21. 12 U.S.C. § 36(f) (1970). While federal law provides the definition of a branch, state
laws supply the rules and conditions under which branching is permitted. 12 U.S.C. § 36(c)
(1970). The deference that must be shown toward state law in determining whether a
national bank is engaged in branch banking is unclear. Compare, e.g., Independent
Bankers Ass'n of America v. Smith, 534 F.2d 921,933 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (what constitutes a
national bank "branch" is a question of federal law to be determined without resort to
state law) with Nebraskans for Independent Banking v. Omaha Nat'l Bank, 530 F.2d 755,
760 (8th Cir. 1976), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 426 U.S. 310 (1976) (in
determining whether a national banking facility is a branch, prime consideration must be
given to state law). The Supreme Court has looked to the purpose of the statute-fostering
competitive equality-in deciding whether a given activity by a national bank is permissi-
ble under the McFadden Act. First Nat'l Bank in Plant City v. Dickinson, 396 U.S. 122
(1969); First Nat'l Bank of Logan v. Walker Bank & Trust Co., 385 U.S. 252 (1966). The
incorporation of 50 different state laws into federal law by the Act has spawned what has
been described as a "bewildering, even ludicrous, system of branching laws which defies
any rational explanation . . . particularly . . . if one is attempting to relate branching
policy to the public interest." SUBCOMM. ON FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, SENATE COMM. ON
BANKING, HOUSING, & URBAN AFFAIRS, 94th Cong. 2d Sess. (1976), COMPEN-
DIUM OF ISSUES RELATING TO BRANCHING BY FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, at v. (Comm.
Print) (comments of Senator Thomas McIntyre, Chairman, Senate Subcommittee on
Financial Institutions) [hereinafter cited as COMPENDIUM]. State restrictions on branch
banking vary according to such diverse factors as distance between banks, population,
county or city lines, state "branching districts," paid-in capital and surplus of the main
bank, minimum capital per branch, and number of auxiliary teller windows. J. WHITE,
BANKING LAW 471-74 (1976). See generally Barrett, A Judicial Impact Statement on the
McFadden Act, COMPENDIUM at 369.
22. See First Nat'l Bank of Logan v. Walker Bank & Trust Co., 385 U.S. 252, 256-61
[Vol. 27:401
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banking system.2 3 Its effect, however, has been to dull competition
within the banking industry by circumscribing banking markets and
insulating banks from regional competition. 24
The Bank Holding Company Act undermines the McFadden Act's
embrace of the dual banking system by interfering with a state's authori-
ty to control the structure of its banking system .2 The Act authorizes the
formation and expansion of bank holding companies (BHC's) through
acquisitions of state and national banks with prior approval of the Feder-
al Reserve Board.2 6 In reviewing proposed acquisitions, the Board must
consider the impact on competition, the financial and managerial re-
sources and future prospects of the bank, and the convenience and needs
of the community to be served. 27 Significantly, the Act is silent as to
(1966). The Logan Court stated, "[I]t appears clear . . . from the legislative history of
§36(c)(1) and (2) that Congress intended to place national and state banks on a basis of
'competitive equality' insofar as branching was concerned." Id. at 261.
23. The dual banking system refers to th division of bank chartering and supervisory
authority between the federal and state governments. The Comptroller of the Currency
generally regulates national banks, while state banking officials regulate state banks. A
fundamental purpose of the dual banking system is to preserve the right of the states to
maintain a banking structure best suited to their individual needs. See generally Brown,
"The Dual Banking System in the United States," (paper prepared for the Department of
Economics and Research, The American Bankers Association), reprinted in COMPEN-
DIUM, supra note 21, at 239.
24. One critic has commented, -[I]t is as if a blanket exemption to the most elementary
antitrust principle-market division-was awarded to the banks of this Nation." COMPEN-
DIUM, supra note 21, at vi (remarks of Senator Thomas McIntyre). Branching restrictions
have also been frowned upon by the Supreme Court. In United States v. Citizens &
Southern Nat'l Bank, 422 U.S. 86 (1975), the Court noted that "[t]he obvious purpose and
effect of a rigid antibranching law are to make the potential bank customers of suburban,
small town, and rural areas a captive market for small unit banks." 422 U.S. at 118. The
Hunt Commission Report on reform of the nation's financial institutions tecommended
the elimination of all state restrictions on branch banking in the interests of enhancing
competition in the banking industry. THE REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON
FINANCIAL STRUCTURE AND REGULATION 45, 61-62 (Government Printing Office, 1971).
See also the "Discussion Principles" of the Fine study recommending that interstate
branching by all federally insured depository institutions be permitted except when in
conflict with state laws. In states in which there is a conflict, the study proposed that
national banks and federally insured out-of-state banks be allowed a branch in all standard
metropolitan areas with population in excess of two million. HouSE COMM. ON BANKING,
HOUSING, & CURRENCY, FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND THE NATION'S ECONOMY: DISCUS-
SION PRINCIPLES 3 (1975).
25. See, e.g., Neally v. Brown, 284 A.2d 480 (Me. 1971) (overturning a state banking
commissioner's denial under state law of permission for a BHC to operate on the grounds
that the Federal Reserve Board is the exclusive arbiter of questions of state law relating to
the establishment of BHC's). But see In re Cleveland Trust Co., 38 Ohio St. 2d 183, 189 n.
4, 311 N.E.2d 854, 860 n.4 (1974) (criticizing Neally). See also Note, Jurisdiction Over
State Banks: Does the Bank Holding Company Act Preempt State Regulation? 36 OHIO
ST. L.J. 114 (1975).
26. 12 U.S.C. § 1842(a) (1970).
27. 12 U.S.C. § 1842(c) (1970).
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whether the Board must consider state branching restrictions in ruling on
BHC acquisitions. Section 7 of the Act reserves to each state the right to
exercise "such powers and jurisdiction which it now has or may hereaf-
ter have with respect to banks, bank holding companies, and subsidiaries
thereof." ' 28 In adopting section 7, however, Congress fully considered
whether its language should be interpreted as automatically subsuming
BHC activities under state branching laws and concluded that it should
not.29 Bolstered by this fact, the Federal Reserve Board's initial interpre-
tation of its responsibilities under the Bank Holding Company Act was
that state branching laws were irrelevant to its review of BHC applica-
tions. 30 That view did not gain the approval of the United States Supreme
Court, which held that the Board must disapprove BHC acquisitions that
would contravene state branching laws. 31 The Court, however, offered
no guidelines to aid the Board in its interpretative task.
28. 12 U.S.C. § 1846 (1970).
29. As it passed the House of Representatives, the Bank Holding Company Act would
have limited BHC expansion to "the geographic limitations that would apply to the
establishment of branches of banks" under state laws, unless the states affirmatively
authorized wider expansion. H.R. 6227, § 5(c), 84th Cong., Ist Sess. (June 14, 1955). In
deleting the restrictive section, the Senate Committee on/,Banking and Currency stated
that the purpose of the Bank Holding Company Act differed from that underlying branch-
ing restrictions and that the Act contained provisions adequate to regulate BHC opera-
tions without aid of state branching laws. S. REP. No. 1095, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1956).
The House ultimately concurred with the deletion and the present version of the Act
contains no such restrictive provision.
30. In a 1960 BHC ruling, the Federal Reserve Board stated that "notwithstanding
proposals made on the floor of the Congress regarding the relation of state branch banking
laws to holding company expansion, the existence in a particular State of a prohibition
against branch banking cannot be weighed as an adverse consideration by the Board in
exercising its judgment on a holding company's application to acquire stock of a bank in
that State." Farmers & Mechanics Trust Co., 46 FED. RES. BULL 14, 16 (1960). The
Board reaffirmed its position in Denver U.S. Bancorporation, 49 FED. RES. BULL. 1518,
1527 (1963), and in First Arkansas Bankstock Corp., 56 FED. RES. BULL. 778, 779 (1970).
31. Whitney Nat'l Bank v. Bank of New Orleans & Trust Co., 379 U.S. 411 (1965).
Since Whitney was decided, neither the Federal Reserve Board nor the courts have
condemned a proposed BHC acquisition on branching grounds. But see note 76 infra.
Whether the Supreme Court's ruling raises any obstacle to multibank holding companies is
thus questionable from both a practical and a legal standpoint. In holding state branching
laws applicable to BHC acquisitions, the Whitney Court relied on vague language in the
Bank Holding Company Act which Congress repealed the following year. The language,
as cited by the Court, directed the Federal Reserve Board to consider "whether or not the
effect of such acquisition . . . would be to expand the size or extent of the bank holding
company system involved beyond limits consistent . . . with the public interest." 12
U.S.C. §1842(c)(5) (1958), cited in 379 U.S. at 418. From this broad directive the Court
reasoned that "a plan of organization violative of federal law [i.e., the McFadden Act]
would be hardly consistent with . . . the public interest." 379 U.S. at 418. By extracting
the language of § 1842(c)(5) from its context, however, the Court gave it a dubious
meaning. Taken in full, the clause relied on by the Court directed the Board to consider
"whether or not the effect of such acquisition ... would be to expand the size or extent
[Vol. 27:401
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II. THE UNITARY OPERATION TEST
The federal courts of appeals have developed the so-called unitary
operation test to determine whether a multibank holding company is, for
all practical purposes, engaged in branch banking. Probing deeper than
the McFadden Act definition of a branch, 32 the unitary operation test
requires an examination of the structure and functioning of BHC owned
banks. Its roots lie in the ruling by the District of Columbia Circuit
Court of Appeals in Camden Trust Co. v. Gidney.33 In that case,
the court declined to overturn the decision of the Comptroller of the
Currency to award a national bank charter to a New Jersey group which
controlled and managed another national bank. A competing bank at-
tacked the Comptroller's decision on the theory that the new affiliate
bank would be operated as a branch of the old and would thereby violate
New Jersey's law restricting branching. While disclaiming judicial au-
thority to find a branching violation in the guise of affiliate banking, 34 the
of the bank holding company system involved beyond limits consistent with adequate and
sound banking, the public interest, and the preservation of competition in the field of
banking." 12 U.S.C. § 1842(c)(5). To the extent that antibranching laws hinder competi-
tion in the banking industry and prevent diversification of risk in aid of bank soundness,
see notes 83 & 84 infra, the Court's vindication of state branching restrictions was
inconsistent with the language of § 1842(c)(5) when read in its entirety.
Congress amended § 1842(c)(5) in 1966 to bring it into conformity with the 1966 Bank
Merger Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1828 (1970). S. REP. No. 1179, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in
[1966] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2385, 2393. In doing so it gave the vague "public
interest" language relied on in Whitney a more definite meaning. As amended, § 1842(c)
directs the Federal Reserve Board to disapprove any BHC acquisition
whose effect . . . may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create
a monopoly, or which in any other manner would be in restraint of trade, unless it
finds that the anticompetitive effects of the proposed transactions are clearly
outweighed in the public interest by the probable effect of the transaction in
meeting the convenience and needs of the community to be served.
12 U.S.C. § 1842(c)(2) (1970). By specifically relating the public interest to the conveni-
ence and needs of the community to be served, the new language is inconsistent with the
meaning Whitney would give it. Not only does it preclude any notion that the words
"public interest" were intended to include deference to state branching laws, cf. Western
Bancshares, Inc. v. Board of Governors, 480 F.2d 749 (10th Cir. 1973) (the "public
interest" in § 1842(c)(2) is not to be construed broadly but is limited to the convenience
and needs of the community to be served), it could reasonably be interpreted to imply that
such laws may be ignored to the extent that they conflict with community banking needs
and convenience.
The significance of the change in statutory language for purposes of interpreting the
effect of state branching laws is uncertain, since the legislative history of the Bank Merger
Act makes no reference to the Whitney decision. The Federal Reserve Board and the
courts have continued to pay lip service to the Supreme Court's ruling despite its question-
able validity, but have yet to give it practical effect.
32. See text accompanying note 21 supra.
33. 301 F.2d 521 (D.C. Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 886 (1962).
34. The court stated that "[i]t is not within our province to pass upon the desirability
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court proceeded to examine the relationship between the two banks. It
found that the new bank would have an independent capital structure,
separately elected directors, fully paid-in and subscribed stock, separate
shareholder liability, a distinct name, a separate business location, sepa-
rate deposit liability, independently determined loan limitations, and
independent ceilings on indebtedness.35 These facts, the court reasoned,
dispelled the claim that the affiliate was masquerading as a branch and
therefore deserving of condemnation under the McFadden Act. 36 The
intent of the founders to circumvent New Jersey's branching law in order
to expand their operations was deemed irrelevant. 37 The court's reliance
on the independent corporate status of the affiliate became the founda-
tion of the unitary operation test.
The next step in the evolution of the test came in First National Bank
in Billings v. First Bank Stock Corp. 38 At issue in that case was whether a
BHC acquisition of a newly formed bank contravened Montana's ban on
branch banking. Unlike the Camden court, however, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit asserted judicial power to "pierce
the corporate veil" in the banking field and uproot de facto violations of
antibranching laws. 39 After enlisting that power to examine the relation-
ship among the BHC subsidiary banks in the case before it, the court was
nevertheless unable to detect a unitary operation. 40 An elusive quality in
the unitary operation test was discernible in the court's reasoning. The
mere fact that two banks have separate corporate organizations does not
shelter them from potential McFadden Act liability, this court warned.
vel non of permitting a national bank to have an 'affiliate,' . . . . If such an affiliate is to
be denied status, Congress must clearly say so." 301 F.2d at 525.
35. Id. at 524-25.
36. The dissent disagreed, pointing out in a strong opinion that the legislative history of
the McFadden Act outspokenly condemned the use of affiliate banks as devices for
evading state branching restrictions. Noting the State of New Jersey's amicus brief, which
stated that the affiliation would have been disallowed under state law had the national
bank been state chartered, the dissent reasoned that the arrangement should have been
condemned. Id. at 525-26.
37. The court dispensed with the challenger's accusation that the arrangement was a
subterfuge by pointing out that it was, on the contrary, "open and notorious." Id. at 523.
38. 306 F.2d 937 (9th Cir. 1962).
39. Citing the Camden decision, the court declared that a bank is engaged in de facto
branch banking if it "is doing business through the instrumentality of [another bank], or
vice versa, in the same way as if the institutions were one." 306 F.2d at 942.
40. The court found the following characteristics determinative: the banks had sepa-
rate officers and employees and only one common director; each bank was subject to a
different supervisory authority and operated under different statutes since one was a
national and the other a state bank; the banks were correspondents but not solely with
each other; the banks were not members of the same clearing house; deposits in one bank
to be credited to the account of depositors of the other bank were not allowed; and no
[Vol. 27:401
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On the other hand, common control of banks through stock ownership
and active dual management did not necessarily prove a branch relation-
ship. 41
Only once has the unitary operation test carried sufficient potency to
condemn a BHC acquisition. In Whitney National Bank v. Bank of New
Orleans & Trust Co. ,42 the "parent" Whitney National Bank, through an
intricate arrangement, established both a new bank and a BHC which
then acquired both banks 3.4 The venture was a self-proclaimed attempt
to conduct branch banking under the umbrella of the Bank Holding
Company Act in violation of Louisiana law. The Federal Reserve
Board's approval of the enterprise spurred emergency legislation by the
state designed to prevent its implementation." In reviewing the Board's
decision, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
declined to consider the effect of that legislation, perhaps reflecting a
reluctance to plunge into an unsettled area of the law.4 5 At that time it
was uncertain whether states could override the Federal Reserve
Board's authority to permit BHC's under the Bank Holding Company
ActA6 The court instead based its ruling on the existence of a unitary
operation between the two subsidiary banks. In doing so, it invoked the
power to pierce the corporate veil which it had declined to exercise in
withdrawals were permitted from one bank of money deposited in the other. 306 F.2d at
942-43.
41. Id. at 942.
42. 323 F.2d 290 (D.C. Cir. 1963), rev'd and remanded on other grounds, 379 U.S. 411
(1965).
43. Whitney National Bank of New Orleans organized the Whitney Holding Corpora-
tion with a $350,000 initial capital expenditure. Using that money, the Whitney Holding
Corporation acquired the dummy Crescent City National Bank. Whitney of New Orleans
then transferred its assets to the Crescent City Bank and changed Crescent City's name to
its own name. Next, the "new" Whitney Bank furnished the Holding Corporation with a
$650,000 "dividend" with which the Whitney National Bank in Jefferson Parish was
organized. All of the Holding Corporation's stock was distributed proportionately to the
stockholders of the original Whitney National Bank of New Orleans. 323 F.2d at 293.
44. The legislation provided: "It shall be unlawful. . . for any bank holding company
or subsidiary thereof to open for business any bank not now opened for business, whether
or not, [sic] a charter, permit, license, or certificate to open for business has already been
issued .... ." Id. at 295.
45. The court indicated that the legislation would be effective against state bank
expansion through BHC's but declined to rule on its applicability to national banks such as
Whitney National. Id. at 299.
46. The constitutionality of state statutes banning BHC operations authorized by the
Federal Reserve Board had never been conclusively decided by the Supreme Court. On
the appeal of the Whitney case, the Court indicated that the statute would pass constitu-
tional muster, 379 U.S. 411, 418-19 (1965), but remanded the question for review by the.
Federal Reserve Board. Id. at 424-25. The Board had earlier taken the position that § 7 of
the Bank Holding Company Act permitted states to prevent the formation of BHC's. See
Trans-Nebraska Co., 49 FED. RES. BULL. 633 (1963). The Board has not altered its
position. The Supreme Court's opinion in Whitney has been interpreted as allowing states
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Camden. 47 Underneath the veil, the court found that the capital of the
new bank was provided by Whitney National; that the new bank would
be managed and controlled by Whitney National executives; and that its
name would be publicly identified with Whitney National.48 Although
intent was declared irrelevant to identifying a unitary operation in Cam-
den, it was embraced as a key element of identification by the Whitney
court. 49 By relying on such a subjective factor, however, the court added
further uncertainty in applying the unitary operation test. Ascertaining
whether a proposed BHC acquisition is the offspring of legitimate busi-
ness needs or a tainted desire to engage in branch banking is a hazardous
task at best.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit was faced
with a less sinister looking BHC operation in Commercial National Bank
v. Board of Governors.50 The First Arkansas Bankstock Corporation
(FABCO), a one-bank holding company operating in Little Rock, was
given Federal Reserve Board approval 5 to acquire the Arkansas First
National Bank in Hot Springs, a well-established bank. Fifty-six other
Arkansas banks protested the acquisition as a violation of Arkansas' ban
on branching. The Arkansas legislature bolstered the attack by enacting
prospective legislation to prohibit the creation or expansion of multibank
holding companies. 52 On appeal, the challengers urged the court to fol-
low the D.C. Circuit's Whitney decision. The court declined to do so,
contrasting the absence of an intent by FABCO to evade Arkansas'
branching law with the blatant subterfuge undertaken by Whitney Na-
tional. 53 Wary of relying on such a subjective factor as intent, however,
the court acknowledged that future cooperation between the two FAB-
CO banks would exist. The absence of a unitary operation was declared
to prohibit the formation of BHC's. Commercial Nat'l Bank v. Board of Governors, 451
F.2d 86, 89 (8th Cir. 1971)/But see Neally v. Brown, 284 A.2d 480 (Me. 1971) See also
Note, supra note 25.
47. The court declared that "[tihe nature of the arrangement, and not the label applied
to it, determines the character of the relationship between two banking institutions." 323
F.2d at 301.
48. Id. at 304.
49. One commentator has criticized the court's emphasis on intent and unitary struc-
ture as blurring the importance of the effect of BHC acquisitions on competition. See
Comment, Branch Banking Limitations Held Applicable to Approved Bank Holding
Company Operation, 39 N.Y.U.L. REV. 686, 694 (1964). As if in response to such
criticism, the D.C. Circuit, in remanding a later case, stated that the purpose of the unitary
operation test is "to enable a determination to be made as to whether a national bank is
attempting to gain a competitive advantage over state banks ...... Independent Bankers
Ass'n v. Board of Governors, 516 F.2d 1206, 1223 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
50. 451 F.2d 86 (8th Cir. 1971).
51. First Arkansas Bankstock Corp., 56 FED. RES. BULL. 778, 35 Fed. Reg. 15,185
(1970).
52. 451 F.2d at 88 n. 1.
53. Id. at 90.
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to be the "decisive test." 54 The court found that the acquired bank would
maintain a separate and independent board of directors with no inter-
locks, separate capital, surplus, and undivided profits, separate loan
limits, and separate management by local officers. In addition, it would
not be identified with the BHC by the public. There was thus no branch-
ing violation 5
The Eighth Circuit reaffirmed the vitality of the unitary operation test
in Gravois Bank v. Board of Governors56 when it directed the Federal
Reserve Board to use the test in reviewing BHC applications. Prior to
Gravois, the Board had applied vague standards in reviewing BHC
acquisitions, 57 reflecting its resistance to be bound by state branching
laws. 58 In Gravois, it erred by rejecting a branching challenge to a BHC
acquisition on the basis of prior Board decisions which had ignored state
branching restrictions.5 9 On appeal, however, the Board conceded for
the first time that state branching laws must be considered in reviewing
BHC applications. 6° Nevertheless, the court held that the Board had
improperly considered the branching challenge and remanded the case
for reconsideration in light of Commercial.61
III. THE DOWNFALL OF THE UNITARY OPERATION TEST
The unitary operation test was workable in polar cases like Whitney
and Commercial since the facts plainly showed the presence or absence
of an intent to engage in de facto branch banking. The test's weaknesses
surfaced, however, with the more difficult factual situation presented in
Grandview National Bank & Trust Co. 62 In Grandview, each of the five
54. Id.
55. Id. The court deferred to the Federal Reserve Board's "expert conclusions" on
the absence of a unitary operation, declaring that since its conclusions were supported by
substantial evidence, "we will not reverse the Board even though we might reach a
contrary conclusion if we were making the initial decision on the matter." Id. Under § 9 of
the Bank Holding Company Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1848 (1970), the findings of the Board are
conclusive if supported by substantial evidence.
56. 478 F.2d 546 (8th Cir. 1973).
57. Id. at 551.
58. In Denver U.S. Bancorporation, Inc., 49 FED. RES. BULL. 1518 (1963), for exam-
ple, the Federal Reserve Board had rejected the reasoning and holding of the D.C. Circuit
in Whitney and had reaffirmed prior decisions ignoring state branching statutes. See note
29 & accompanying text supra.
59. 478 F.2d at 551.
60. Brief for Respondent at 12-13, Gravois Bank & Trust Co. v. Board of Governors,
478 F.2d 546 (8th Cir. 1973).
61. 478 F.2d at 552.
62. 550 F.2d 415 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 64 (1977). The factual difficulty
was reflected in the court's assertion, on one hand, that Bancshares' activities "appear to
be 'unitary,"' and "suggest a defacto unitary system," 550 F.2d at 419, and, on the other,
that "as a BHC Bancshares does not conduct a direct unitary operation. ... Id. at 420.
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interim directors of the new bank was a director of other banks in the
Bancshares' system and four were officers or directors of Bancshares
itself. Bancshares' avowed intent was to make the directorships of the
new bank and its other affiliates "substantially separate and indepen-
dent" once the new bank was established. 63 On its face, the acquisition
conceivably could survive the Whitney intent test.64 However, it could
not so easily hurdle the structural requirements of the unitary operation
test. Bancshares had supplied all the capital of the new bank by purchas-
ing its stock. Graduates of Bancshares' management training program
staffed the new bank. Although the bank would maintain separate books
of account, its recordkeeping would be performed by Bancshares' auto-
mated data processing services which provided general ledger service for
all of its affiliates. In contrast to the old and well-established bank in
Commercial, the acquired bank in Grandview was a newly formed bank
whose identity would be merged with that of its BHC. All of the banks in
the Bancshares system had similar names which linked them in the public
eye. They were advertised as a "family of banks" which offered
"statewide trust services" and a "team" of 140 trust specialists. Al-
though the banks had separate legal loan limits, they could increase their
loan capacity through participation arrangements in each other's loans. 65
On its facts, Grandview presented a compelling case for using the
unitary operation test to vindicate state branching restrictions. But the
court was troubled by the resemblance of legitimate BHC operations to
branch banking. Acquisition of bank stock is the usual way a BHC
acquires ownership of a bank, it observed. Common control, resulting in
cooperation between a BHC and its subsidiaries, is a usual result of
common ownership. Bancshares was doing nothing more than engaging
in the traditional and legal means by which a BHC may work with its
affiliates."6 Furthermore, the proposed acquisition by Bancshares had
been approved by the Missouri Director of Finance pursuant to Mis-
souri's law governing BHC activities. 67 If the state did not perceive a
violation of its branching laws, the court was reluctant to pierce the
corporate veil and find one.6
The Grandview court's dilemma was an outgrowth of the tension
between the differing policies underlying the Bank Holding Company
63. Id. at 418.
64. The intention of Bancshares to install an independent board of directors was
unquestioned by the Federal Reserve Board in its review of the proposed arrangement. 62
FED. RES. BULL. 368, 369-70 (1976), 41 Fed. Reg. 12,093 (1976).
65. 550 F.2d at 418-19.
66. Id. at 418.
67. Id. at 417 n.3.
68. Id. at 420.
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Act and the McFadden Act.69 In resolving the dilemma, the court
concluded that state branching policies must yield to the authority of the
Bank Holding Company Act. It noted that Congress was aware of the
potential conflict with the McFadden Act when it authorized the forma-
tion of BHC's and had expressly reserved the right of states to regulate
BHC operations directly in order to avoid conflicts with branching
policies.7' Therefore, the court reasoned, the judiciary should not invoke
state branching laws to police BHC operations indirectly when states
have declined to limit them directly through bank holding company
laws. 71
While not expressly acknowledging that it was abandoning the unitary
operation test,72 the court left no doubt that such would be the effect. In
the absence of state legislation restricting BHC activities, the court
clearly indicated that it would no longer engage in a case-by-case exami-
nation of the structure of BHC operations. Grandview Bank & Trust Co.
thus offers a haven to bankers seeking to expand their operations in
states which restrict branching but have minimal BHC regulation. 73 The
court's sanction of BHC operations in such states was not completely
unqualified, however. If a subsidiary bank receives deposits, pays
checks or lends money on behalf of a parent bank, the court hinted that it
would find a branching violation. 74
Grandview Bank & Trust Co. may thus have sprouted a hybrid version
of the unitary operation test based on the McFadden Act's three-pronged
definition of a branch. 75 Although the Act's definition is open-ended, its
minimum criteria offer a more satisfactory harmonization of the McFad-
69. See text accompanying notes 18-30, supra.
70. 550 F.2d at 419-20.
71. Id. at 420.
72. The court expressed little appreciation of the significance of its ruling. It failed to
acknowledge its divergence from its prior opinions in Commercial and Gravois, nor did it
discuss the correctness of its decision in light of the Supreme Court's mandate giving state
branching statutes precedence. See note 30 supra. Its departure from the unitary opera-
tion test was somewhat guarded. Deferring to the D.C. Circuit's decision in Whitney, it
cautioned that the unitary operation test "may have validity" in cases of fraud or
complete subterfuge; nevertheless, the court defended its approach as "more realistic."
550 F.2d at 420.
73. Fourteen states which restrict branching have no limitations on BHC acquisitions
of subsidiary banks. Five require state approval. Twelve have a variety of other restric-
tions, primarily limiting the aggregate percentage of bank stock that can be owned by a
BHC. J. WHITE, supra note 21, at 59.
74. In sustaining the BHC operation, the court observed that "notwithstanding the
similarity with some phases of branch banking, there is no showing that New Bank will,
within the purview of 12 U.S.C § 36(f) [the McFadden Act], operate to receive deposits,
pay checks or lend money on behalf of the parent bank." 550 F.2d at 420.
75. That the Eighth Circuit intended to give birth to a new test based on the McFadden
definition of a branch is doubtful in light of its decision in St. Louis County Nat'l Bank v.
Mercantile Trust, 548 F.2d 716 (8th Cir. 1976), in which it disapproved the operation of a
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den Act and the Bank Holding Company Act than the vague and elusive
unitary operation test. A limited McFadden test would enable the courts
to pay deference to state branching laws in cases in which BHC's violate
the clear language of the McFadden Act, while giving BHC's maximum
leeway to expand their operations otherwise. The objective elements of
the test would considerably simplify the courts' task and, by marking a
clearer line between legitimate BHC activities and branch banking,
would assist BHC's in planning their expansion within lawful bounds.
7 6
IV. GRANDVIEW'S IMPACT ON BRANCHING POLICY-SOME
PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS
It is too early to gauge the impact of the Grandview decision in other
circuits." If the Eighth Circuit's reasoning is followed, it will undoubted-
ly stimulate legislatures to review state laws governing branch banking
and bank holding company operations. 78 Small bankers seeking protec-
tion from BHC competition will urge stricter regulation of BHC opera-
tions. 79 Others eager to expand and compete with BHC's will advocate a
national bank's trust department as a branch office even though it did not accept deposits,
make loans, or pay checks. The court stated that the three routine banking functions listed
in § 36(f) are not the only indicia of branch banking and that branching questions must be
considered in light of the McFadden Act's goal of maintaining competitive equality. 548
F.2d at 719.
76. A McFadden Act version of the unitary operation test is currently being tested in
the Sixth Circuit. The Eastern District of Michigan recently struck down the Michigan
National Corporation's "automatic transaction service" (ATS) which enabled customers
of one of the BHC's sixteen banking subsidiaries to make deposits or withdrawals at any
bank within the holding company system. Kelley v. Michigan Nat'l Corp., No. 77-1240
(E.D. Mich. Feb. 28, 1978) (order granting permanent injunction). The Federal Reserve
Board had earlier ruled that the ATS service constituted branch banking in violation of the
McFadden Act and conditioned its approval of the BHC's acquisition of a new bank on
that bank's non-participation in the service. Michigan Nat'l Corp., Federal Reserve Board
Press Release (Jan. 31, 1978). Prior challenges invoking the McFadden Act had failed. See
First Nat'l Bank in Howell v. Heimann, No. 77-2264 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 25, 1977) (order
granting summary judgment); Central State Bank v. Bloom, No. 77-0484 (D.D.C. July 27,
1977) (order granting summary judgment).
77. In a case arising in the Fifth Circuit one month after Grandview, the court sus-
tained the Federal Reserve Board's approval of a BHC acquisition on the basis of the
unitary operation test. First State Bank of Clute v. Board of Governors, 553 F.2d 950, 953-
54 (5th Cir. 1977). Grandview was not cited in the opinion. The Board itself has continued
to apply the unitary operation test despite the Grandview decision. See, e.g., First Int'l
Bancshares, Inc., 42 Fed. Reg. 36,298 (July 14, 1977).
78. Review of branching and BHC statutes is already underway in several states. See,
e.g., TEXAS STATE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMM. ON FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS,
INTERIM REPORT: BANK HOLDING COMPANIES, reprinted in 1976 Hearings, supra note 4, at
233; Michigan Department of Commerce Interoffice Communication: The Impact of Bank
Holding Companies on Bank Performance and Structure in Michigan (November 29,
1976), reprinted in 1976 Hearings at 109; Golembe Assoc., Inc., Report and Recommenda-
tions from a Study of the Bureau of Banking of the Commonwealth of Virginia (Feb. 1976)
(study for the Virginia Bureau of Banking recommending statewide branching).
79. The fear of small bankers that competition from BHC affiliated banks will drive
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lifting of branching restrictions. If the states yield to the demands of the
former and continue to impede bank expansion, then Congress should
consider whether continued deference to state banking law is in the
public interest. 80
There are several reasons to support the elimination of branching
restrictions. One obvious benefit of branch banking is customer conveni-
ence due to a higher ratio of bank offices to bank customers. 81 Another is
larger lending capacity which benefits individual borrowers as well as
business and government, whose demands for capital are skyrocketing.
Branching also spurs economic growth by increasing the mobility of
funds. 82 By enabling banks to broaden their geographical base, branching
reduces bank dependency on the special economic structure of a given
area, thereby diversifying risk.83 By promoting competition in local mar-
kets, 84 branch banking also tends to lower interest rates on loans.
85
them out of business does not appear to be warranted. Studies have shown that small unit
banks have not been adversely affected by competition from branch banks and that such
banks can be as profitable as branch operations. See Guttentag, Branch Banking: A
Summary of the Issues and the Evidence, reprinted in COMPENDIUM, supra note 21, at 99,
108-09; Darnell & Keen Small Bank Survival, Is the Wolf at the Door?, FED. RES.
BANK OF PHILADELPHIA, Bus. REV. 16 (Nov. 1974).
80. Congress has already taken an interest in the branching issue. See generally 1976
Hearings, supra note 4.
81. Compare the bank office per customer ratio of New York City--one full service
office for every 9,075 people-with that of Chicago--one office for every 34,357 people.
1976 Hearings, supra note 4, at 149 (statement of James A. Cassin, Senior Vice President,
The First National Bank of Chicago).
82. Id. at 154-155. The mobility of funds can also result in a flow of funds out of
depressed inner city areas to high-growth suburban areas if precautions are not taken. Id.
at 378 (statement of Carl J. Schmitt, Superintendent of Banks, State of California).
83. Statewide branching in California, for example, has made it easier for banks to
withstand local adversities such as crop failures in drought stricken areas or layoffs in the
aerospace industry.
84. The most common criticism of branch banking is that it increases concentration in
the banking industry, thereby hampering competition. Such criticism may be warranted in
some states, such as California (see 1976 Hearings, supra note 4, at 375-77), and may
justify restrictions on the percentage of total deposits a single bank may control within a
given state. Research indicates that, on the whole, branch banking has had a procompeti-
tive impact and that its continued prohibition is anticompetitive. See Shull, Multiple Office
Banking and Competition: A Review of the Literature, reprinted in COMPENDIUM, supra
note 21, at 113, 116-17; 1976 Hearings, supra note 4, at 290-92. A study of Pennsylvania
banking by the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia indicated that the state would
experience higher concentration regardless of whether or not it adopted branching. The
study concluded that statewide branch banking would produce the least concentrated
market structure and "offers the greatest potential for reaping the benefits of increased
competiton." Changing Pennsylvania's Branching Laws: An Economic Analysis, FED.
RES. BANK OF PHILADELPHIA, Bus. REV. 13 (Dec. 5, 1972).
85. Note, The Perennial Issue: Branch Banking, FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CHI-
CAGO, BUSINESS CONDITIONS, Feb. 1974, reprinted in COMPENDIUM, supra note 21, at 437,
448-50.
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Additionally, the development of money-saving electronic funds transfer
systems and customer bank communication terminals would progress
faster without branch banking restrictions. 86
Bank holding companies offer many of the advantages of branch
banking, but have important drawbacks which make them a poor substi-
tute. Because of higher capitalization requirements, BHC's cannot re-
spond to the changing needs of communities as readily as branch
banks.87 Since each bank in a BHC organization has its own lending
limits, a BHC cannot allocate funds as efficiently as a branch bank.
Branching allows for incremental expansion and thus makes banking
services feasible in communities that could not support an independent
bank as part of a BHC system. 88 Entry into new markets by de novo
branching is a greater stimulus to competition than is entry by BHC
acquisitions of established banks.8 9 Finally, there is some indication that
BHC's increase the risk exposure of acquired banks. BHC's generally
pay out a higher portion of their earnings in dividends, resulting in a
86. Toward this end, the National Commission on Electronic Funds Transfers has
recommended that geographic restrictions on EFTS be eliminated. NATIONAL COMMIS-
SION ON ELECTRONIC FUND TRANSFERS, EFT AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 31 (1977). This
could require a change in state branching laws since the courts have deemed EFTS
terminals to be branches. Independent Bankers Ass'n v. Smith, 534 F.2d 921 (D.C. Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 862 (1976); State of Illinois ex rel. Lignoul v. Continental
Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 536 F.2d 176 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 871 (1976). See
generally Symposium on Electronic Funds Transfer Systems, 25 CATH. U.L. REV. 687-842
(1976). However, Senator McIntyre has introduced legislation to permit national banks to
establish EFT systems nationwide regardless of state restrictions. S. 2293, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1977).
87. Independent banks must meet paid-in capital requirements as a condition to receiv-
ing a charter. Branches of independent banks are free from this requirement, although
many states require the parent bank to increase its capital base as a condition to establish-
ing a branch.
88. For these reasons, BHC's have converted their subsidiaries into branches in states
in which branching restrictions have been lifted. See, e.g., United States v. Citizens &
Southern Nat'l Bank, 422 U.S. 86 (1975) (BHC converted bank subsidiaries into branches
when Georgia branching restrictions were eased). See also Parcell, Banking Structure and
Statewide Branching: The Potentialfor Virginia, 18 WM. & MARY L. REV. 93, 97 (1976).
89. The Bank Holding Company Act recognizes the greater competitive benefits of de
novo entries as opposed to entries by acquisitions and permits the Federal Reserve Board
to differentiate between the two. 12 U.S.C. § 1843 (c)(8) (1970). The Board has done so by
providing an expedited procedure for de novo entry applications. 12 C.F.R. § 225.4(b)
(1977). Although de novo entries by BHC's have increased in recent years, most have
been in areas where the BHC was already represented. See Lawrence & Talley, An
Assessment of Bank Holding Companies, 62 FED. RES. BULL. 15, 16 (1976).
The effect of BHC's on competition has been heavily criticized in recent years. See
Competition ian Banking Act of 1976: Hearings on S. 2721 Before the Senate Comm. on
Banking, Housing, & Urban Affairs, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-3 (1976) (statement of Senator
William Proxmire and findings and purposes of S. 2721).
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lower capital ratio than independent banks.' BHC's have also engaged
in a large number of nonbanking activities in recent years, which has
strained their bank subsdiaries. 9
1
IV. CONCLUSION
Although multibank holding companies lack all of the virtues of branch
banking, they have enabled bankers to respond to evolving banking
needs in states which have erected artificial barriers to bank growth. By
giving these entities a clear path around antibranching laws, the decision
in Grandview Bank & Trust Co. is a strike in favor of more convenient
and competitive banking. Grandview was the offspring of a clash be-
tween the McFadden Act's deference to the restrictive policies of state
branching laws and the endorsement of legitimate multibank holding
company activity by the Bank Holding Company Act. Previous decisions
attempted to reconcile the two statutes by employing an elusive test to
determine whether a BHC had transgressed into the forbidden territory
of branch banking. Taking a more realistic approach, the Eighth Circuit
recognized the inherent similarities between multibank holding
companies and branch banking and made no attempt to harmonize the
conflicting policies of the two laws. Giving precedence to the Bank
Holding Company Act, the court declined to invoke antibranching laws
to thwart BHC expansion judicially when states have failed to do so
legislatively. By hinting that it might find a branching violation when a
BHC subsidiary receives deposits, cashes checks, or makes loans on
behalf of a sister bank, however, the decision offers a pragmatic accom-
modation of the McFadden Act based on its three-pronged definition of a
branch.
Grandview was necessarily an imperfect victory for multiple office
banking. States remain free to exercise their authority under the Bank
Holding Company Act to impose antibranching restraints on BHC opera-
90. Lawrence & Talley, supra note 89, at 18-19.
91. The Bank Holding Company Act permits BHC's to engage in non-banking ac-
tivities which are "so closely related to banking... as to be a proper incident thereto."
12 U.S.C § 1843(c)(8) (1970). The Federal Reserve Board has approved the following non-
banking activities, among others: investment advising, economic and management
consulting, automobile leasing, insurance brokering, and the providing of courier, book-
keeping, data processing, and billing services. 12 C.F.R. § 225.4 (1977). In addition,
§ 1843(a)(2) contains a "grandfather clause" allowing companies which became BHC's by
virtue of the 1970 Bank Holding Company Act Amendments to continue certain nonbank
activities engaged in prior thereto. These activities include advertising, trucking, coal
mining, farming, and window cleaning. J. WHITE, supra note 21, at 349-52. See
generally Hearings on S. 2721, supra note 89, and P. HELLER, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL
BANK HOLDING COMPANY LAW, chs. 4 & 5 (1976).
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tions by direct legislation. By forcing independent bankers to turn to
state legislators to shield them from BHC competition, the Grandview
decision will undoubtedly increase the pressure on states to use that
authority. If the states display infidelity to the public interest by extend-
ing antibranching laws to BHC operations, congressional action will be
needed to unshackle the banking industry in order to meet changing
banking needs.
Melanie L. Fein
INSURANCE: McCarran-Ferguson Act Section 1013(b)
Applies to Insured-Insurer Relationship. Barry v. St. Paul
Fire & Marine Insurance Co., 555 F.2d 3 (1st Cir. 1977).
The McCarran-Ferguson Act' grants the insurance industry broad
antitrust immunity to the extent that the industry is regulated by the
states. 2 An explicit exception to this immunity, however, is provided by
section 1013(b) 3 of the Act, which subjects insurers to liability under the
Sherman Antitrust ,Act4 if they engage in agreements or acts involving
1. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-15 (1976) [hereinafter referred to as the Act].
2. So long as insurance is regulated by state law, the federal antitrust laws are
generally inapplicable. Section 1012(b) of the Act provides:
No act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or supersede any law
enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance, or
which imposes a fee or tax upon such business, unless such Act specifically
relates to the business of insurance. Provided, That after June 30, 1948, the Act of
July 1890, as amended, known as the Sherman Act, and the Act of October 15,
1914, as amended, known as the Clayton Act, and the Act of September 26, 1914,
known as the Federal Trade Commission Act, as amended, shall be applicable to
the business of insurance to the extent that such business is not regulated by State
law.
3. Section 1013(b) provides: "Nothing contained in this chapter shall render the said
Sherman Act inapplicable to any agreement to boycott, coerce, or intimidate, or act of
boycott, coercion, or intimidation." A concise analysis of the Act is provided in 7 J. VON
KALINOWSKI, ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE REGULATION, ch. 47 (1969 & Supp. 1977).
4. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976). In general, the Sherman Act forbids contracts, combina-
tions, conspiracies in restraint of trade, and the acts of monopolizing or attempting to
monopolize in restraint of trade. For background information on the Sherman Act and
developments that led to the subsequent enactment of its counterparts, the Clayton Act,
and the Federal Trade Commission Act, see W. LETWIN, LAW AND ECONOMIC POLICY IN
AMERICA: THE EVOLUTION OF THE SHERMAN ANTITRUST ACT (1965).
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boycotts, coercion, or intimidation.5 In Barry v. St. Paul Fire & Marine
Insurance Co. ,6 the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
was recently called upon to determine whether this so-called "boycott
exception" applies only to insurance company boycotts of other insur-
ance companies and agents, or whether it applies as well to insurers'
refusals to deal with policyholders.7 In holding that the boycott excep-
tion is applicable to the insured-insurer relationship, the court rejected a
growing line of case authority to the contrary, 8 thus suggesting the
possibility of a greater role for antitrust in the regulation of insurance and
a stronger position for consumers in the regulatory process. 9
In June 1975, eight Rhode Island doctors and six patients filed a class
action suit against four companies selling medical malpractice insur-
ance. 10 The plaintiffs sought to represent two classes - all licensed
physicians practicing in Rhode Island and all citizens of that state who
were or would be under a doctor's care. II They claimed that St. Paul Fire
& Marine changed its malpractice renewal policies so as to diminish the
effectiveness of the insurance coverage, and that when the dissatisfied
policyholders tried to take their business elsewhere, other companies
refused to sell them malpractice insurance of any sort. 2 Alleging that
5. In analyzing the validity of a federal antitrust claim under the McCarran-Ferguson
Act, one's initial determination is whether or not the act complained of constitutes "the
business of insurance" within the meaning of § 1012(b), and if so, whether it is regulated
by state law. A negative answer to either of these inquiries removes the case from the
antitrust immunity of the Act. But if the answer to both is in the affirmative, the Act
protects the insurer from federal antitrust claims unless there is an agreement or act of
boycott, coercion, or intimidation within the scope of section 1013(b). See, e.g., voN
KALINOWSKI, supra note 3; Annot., 21 L. Ed. 2d 938, 944-47 (1969).
6. 555 F.2d 3 (1st Cir.), cert. granted, 98 S. Ct. 391 (1977).
7. Id. at 5.
8. See note 41 & accompanying text infra.
9. Insurance regulation is generally considered to have three main objectives: avoid-
ing overreaching by insurers, assuring solidity and solvency of insurers, and assuring
reasonable and fair rating classifications and rates. R. KEETON, BASIC TEXT ON INSUR-
ANCE LAW 554 (1971). To date, insurance consumers have been unorganized, and their
complaints about insurers have tended to have little or no beneficial impact upon the
.regulatory process. Id. at 565.
10. Barry v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., No. 75-176, slip op. at 1-2 (D.R.I. Nov.
19, 1975). The other defendants were Hartford Casualty Company, Hartford Fire Insur-
ance Company, Aetna Casualty & Surety Company, and Travelers Insurance Company.
II. All questions relating to class certification were deferred until resolution of the
motions for dismissal. Id. at 20 n.l.
12. Id. at 3; 555 F.2d at 5. The physicians alleged that St. Paul Fire & Marine changed
its future malpractice policies to provide coverage only on a "claims made" basis, rather
than an "occurrence" basis. The latter protects the holder from liability for any act
performed while the policy is in effect, while the former protects the holder only against
claims made during the policy period. Thus, as the court noted, a doctor who practiced for
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these actions manifested a conspiracy to monopolize the selling of mal-
practice insurance in violation of the Sherman Act, the plaintiffs sought
both injunctive relief 13 and treble damages.' 4 The initial success of their
Sherman Act claim depended entirely on whether section 1013(b) of the
McCarran-Ferguson Act included policyholders among those protected
from boycott, coercion, or intimidation. 5 Concluding that Congress
intended this section to be narrowly applied to protect only insurance
agents and companies from being blacklisted by combinations of insur-
ers, the district court dismissed the case.16
On appeal, the First Circuit reversed and remanded, with one judge
dissenting.' 7 The appellate court was particularly concerned with the
lower court's reliance on the legislative history of section 1013(b), and
held that the section clearly prohibited any agreement or act of boycott,
coercion, or intimidation, including insurers' refusals to deal with policy-
holders.' 8 Because the statutory language of the section was unambigu-
only one year would need only one year's "occurrence" policy to be fully covered, but
would need several years of "claims made" coverage to protect himself from claims
arising from his acts during the single year. Id. at 20 n.1.
13. The Clayton Act § 16, 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1976), authorizes private antitrust suits for
injunctive relief.
14. Id. § 4, 5 U.S.C. § 15 (1976), provides a treble damage remedy for antitrust
violations.
In addition to the federal antitrust claim, the plaintiffs alleged certain violations of state
common law. Barry v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., No. 75-176, slip op. at 2-3; 555
F.2d at 12-13.
15. Since the McCarran-Ferguson Act insulates the insurance industry from federal
antitrust laws to the extent it is state regulated, once state regulation exists, the only way
to assert a Sherman Act claim is through the Act's boycott exception. Otherwise, antitrust
claims against insurers must be brought under state antitrust laws. See note 23 & accom-
panying text infra.
16. Barry v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., No. 75-176, slip op. at 10-12. In reaching
this conclusion, the district court did not analyze the McCarran-Ferguson Act or its
legislative history. It simply relied on an established line of case authority interpreting the
history. See note 41 & accompanying text infra.
17. 555 F.2d 3 (1st Cir.), cert. granted, 98 S. Ct. 391 (1977).
18. Id. at 12. Although ruling against the lower court's dismissal based on a narrow
reading of § 1013(b), the First Circuit mentioned two other grounds for dismissal which the
district court had found no need to consider. One was mootness. Shortly after Dr. Barry
filed suit, Rhode Island established a joint underwriting association to provide all medical
malpractice insurance in the state. After requesting briefs from both sides on the moot-
ness issue, the court concluded that for purposes of its jurisdiction, the state's act did not
entirely extinguish the plaintiffs' claims for relief. Id. at 5-6. The other ground was
standing. In this connection, the court noted that dismissal could be affirmed if none of
the plaintiffs had standing to sue, but it noted also that the change in malpractice coverage
had increased costs for doctors and that no one was more directly injured by a conspiracy
among insurance sellers than those who purchased insurance. Concluding that the doctors
had standing, the court found it unnecessary to decide whether the patients also had
standing. Id. at 12 n.7.
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ous on its face, the court concluded there was no need to rely on its
legislative history. 19
I. THE SCOPE OF SECTION 1013(b)-INCONSISTENT
JUDICIAL PRECEDENT
The first successful antitrust action against the insurance industry was
United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Association,2 in which the
Supreme Court held that the Sherman Act would prohibit an association
of insurance companies from conspiring to fix rates and commissions
and from engaging in boycotts and other types of coercion against
nonmember companies and their customers.2 Less than a year after this
decision, Congress enacted the McCarran-Ferguson Act which largely
overruled South-Eastern and, in effect, left the industry subject to
antitrust regulation only through section 1013(b). The Act declared that
state regulation of insurance was in the public interest. In order to
provide the states with both incentive and time to enact their own taxing
and regulatory laws, it established a three-year moratorium22 during
which federal antitrust laws were to be inapplicable to the industry. At
the end of this period, the antitrust laws would apply to the insurance
business, but only to the extent it was not regulated by state law.
Through section 1013(b), however, the Sherman Act would continue to
reach the industry regardless of state regulation, if insurers engaged in
the specifically forbidden acts.
23
The narrow construction of section 1013(b), upon which the lower
court in Barry relied, seems to have been first suggested by the United
States District Court for the District of Oregon in Transnational Insur-
19. Id. at 7-8. Judge Campbell, in dissent, agreed with the majority that reliance on
legislative history was unnecessary, but he noted nevertheless that explicit support could
be found in that history for the lower court's interpretation of § 1013(b). To avoid the
ambiguity of the history, however, he grounded his support of the district court's ruling
primarily on statutory construction and administrative concerns. Id. at 14-15. See notes
62-69 & accompanying text infra.
20. 322 U.S. 533 (1944). In South-Eastern, the Supreme Court held that the business of
insurance was interstate commerce and, therefore, subject to federal regulation. For more
than 70 years before this ruling, the highest court had held that insurance was not
interstate commerce. Those earlier decisions are surveyed in Powell, Insurance as
Commerce, 57 HARV. L. REV. 937 (1944).
21. 322 U.S. at 562.
22. The moratorium was later extended for an additional six months by the Act of July
25, 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-238, ch. 326, 61 Stat. 448 (1947).
23. For background information on the enactment of the McCarran-FergusonAct, see
3 H. TOULMIN, TREATISE ON ANTI-TRuST LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES § 22.2 (1949 &
Supp. 1976). See also VON KALINOWSKI, supra note 3.
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ance Co. v. Rosenlund.24 The dispute in Transnational centered around
an agreement whereby the defendants organized and operated a general
agency to solicit and underwrite the plaintiff's mobile home insurance.
When the agency was later sold to another insurer and the defendants
channeled to it nearly all the insurance business previously handled by
the plaintiff, Transnational charged them with boycotting and other
antitrust violations. 25 The court considered whether Transnational's boy-
cott allegations were sufficient to trigger section 1013(b), thus removing
the McCarran-Ferguson Act's antitrust immunity. After a detailed con-
sideration of the meaning of the word "boycott," the court granted the
defendants' motion for summary judgment, finding no evidence of boy-
cott, coercion, or intimidation. 26 In dicta, however, the court suggested
that a narrow construction of section 1013(b) based on the Act's legisla-
tive history might provide another ground for dismissal. 2
7
24. 261 F. Supp. 12 (D. Ore. 1966).
25. Id. at 25. In addition to the antitrust claim, Transnational charged breach of
contract and unjust enrichment. Id. at 18-19.
26. Id. at 28. Judge Kilkenny, writing for the court, observed that the Irish originated
the character for whom the term "boycott" was named and referred to a discussion of the
origin of the name included in State v. Glidden, 55 Conn. 46, 8 A. 890, 896 (1887). "To fall
within the generally accepted meaning of boycott, [he concluded] there must be . . . a
concerted refrainment from business relations with another or . . . a concerted persua-
sion of third persons outside of the combination to so refrain." 261 F. Supp. at 28.
27. Id. at 26. The court stated:
It would seem that the Congress, when enacting the McCarran-Ferguson Act,
was concerned with an activity which is not here indicated. The legislative history
shows that the boycott, coercion and intimidation exception, was placed in the
legislation to protect insurance agents from the issuance by insurance companies
of a "black-list," which would name companies or agents which were beyond the
pale. This list, in effect, was a directive to an agent not to write insurance in the
name of or for the black-listed company; otherwise, he would be stripped of his
agency and not permitted to write insurance for any of the members of the
governing organization of insurance companies.
Id. (Emphasis in original). To support this interpretation of the legislative history, the
court cited one page from the Congressional Record during House debate on the bill (S.
340) that was to become the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 91 CONG. REC. 1087 (1945). Id. at 27
n. . The court provided no explanation for singling out one page from the more than 30
pages comprising congressional debate leading to passage of the Act. Debate on the bill is
reported in 91 CONG. REC. 478-88 (1945) (Senate) and 91 CONG. REC. 1085-93 (1945)
(House). Although the House adopted the conference report by voice vote with no debate,
91 CONG. REC. 1396 (1945), the Senate debated the report at some length before adopting it
by a vote of 68-8, 91 CONG. REC. 1442-44, 1474, 1477-89 (1945).
The statement of Mr. Celler, which appears on the single page cited, was aimed at
convincing the House that the Senate-passed bill was preferable to the bill reported by the
House Judiciary Committee because it made the Sherman Act applicable to agreements as
well as acts of boycott, coercion, or intimidation. The House bill omitted the word
"agreement," leaving only acts within reach of the Sherman Act. Mr. Celler's reference
to blacklisting of small companies and agents was made to illustrate for his colleagues the
importance of amending the bill, and it is clear from his remarks that such blacklisting was
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This dicta was substantially reinforced in Meicler v. Aetna Casualty &
Surety Co.,28 when the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Texas relied on the Transnational version of the legislative
history to dismiss a claim brought by consumers against automobile
liability insurers. The plaintiffs, whose insurer had reclassified them in a
higher risk category upon expiration of their policy, attempted to pur-
chase coverage from other companies at their former rate. They soon
found, however, that no one would sell them insurance at this price, and
accordingly they brought suit alleging a concerted refusal to deal in
violation of the Sherman Act. 29 The court found that since the state of
Texas regulated auto insurance rates and rate classifications, the anti-
trust claim would be barred by the McCarran-Ferguson Act unless the
Meiclers could find shelter in section 1013(b). Noting that no authority
could be located for applying the section in the context of company
relations with policyholders, the court quoted from the Transnational
court's version of the legislative history to support its holding that the
section was inapplicable. Further, in the court's view, if the Meiclers'
allegations were to fall within the section's purview, the intent of the Act
would be subverted. 30 It reached this conclusion by reasoning that the
purpose of the Act. was to exempt insurance from federal antitrust laws
insofar as the industry was regulated by the states. Accordingly, because
Texas regulated rate classifications and rate setting, federal antitrust
laws could not be used to attack them. Thus the court dismissed the case
for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted."
This dismissal is in accord with the McCarran-Ferguson Act, for both
the Act and the legislative history indicate that a major purpose in its
enactment was to allow state-regulated rate fixing. 32 While it reached the
a serious concern of the Justice Department and many members of Congress. It is not
clear, however, that he or any other representative thought that only blacklisting of this
sort should fall within the scope of the boycott exception. Years later, Mr. Celler stated
that his "entire purpose" in urging this amendment had been to broaden and not to restrict
the applicability of the Sherman Act. 120 CONG. REC. 37,352 (1974).
28. 372 F. Supp. 509 (S.D. Tex.), aff'd, 506 F.2d 732 (5th Cir. 1975).
29. 372 F. Supp. at 511. The Meiclers filed a class action suit against all liability
insurers licensed to do business in the state. Id. at 510.
30. Id. at 514.
31. Id.
32. That the Act allowed rate fixing was the subject of considerable discussion at the
time Congress was considering its enactment. See, e.g., 91 CONG. REC. 1481 (1945)
(exchange between Senator Ferguson, one of the bill's co-sponsors, and Senator Pepper
during debate preceding adoption of the conference report). Senator Ferguson stated that
the bill was intended to permit rating bureaus so long as they were regulated by the states.
When asked if the bill permitted rate fixing, Senator Ferguson said, "Yes. There is no
doubt that the bill allows it .... " In this colloquy he emphasized that the bill would not
allow private agreement, but only those regulated by the states. Id.
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correct result, the Meicler court based its ruling on shaky ground. Rather
than holding that state-regulated rates and classifications didnot consti-
tute an agreement or an act of boycotting within the scope of section
1013(b), the court resurrected the Transnational court's version of the
legislative history to justify a broader conclusion that the section was
inapplicable to policyholders. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit approved this
historical reading and affirmed the lower court's holding that the boycott
exception did not apply to the Meiclers' claim. 33 The appellate court
emphasized that to hold otherwise would "emasculate" the McCarran-
Ferguson Act, which left the states in charge of relations between policy-
holders and insurance companies.34.
While the problem with Meicler lies not so much in the result as in the
imprecision of the court's analysis, the same cannot be said of Addrisi v.
Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States,35 in which the
Ninth Circuit applied a logical, precise analysis to an antitrust claim, but,
because of its reliance on the Meicler and Transnational courts' in-
terpretation of the legislative history, arrived at a surprising conclusion.
The challenged practice in Addrisi was the defendant life insurance
company's offer of loans to prospective policyholders at interest rates
below the prevailing ones. As security for such a loan, the borrower was
required to purchase a high-cost life insurance policy from the defend-
ant. Addrisi applied for an Equitable loan and claimed he was coerced
into purchasing a policy which cost him $864 more than the cost of the
usual type of life insurance policy. 36 The Ninth Circuit held that there
was no need to consider whether Addrisi's allegations of economic
coercion fit within the meaning of the words "acts of coercion" as used
in section 1013(b), because the legislative history showed that this sec-
tion was intended to be applied only to the narrow area of boycott or
33. 506 F.2d 732, 734 (5th Cir. 1975). Interestingly, the Fifth Circuit, in its affirmance,
seems to have narrowed the judicial construction of § 1013(b) beyond that of the lower
court. The district courts stated that the section was designed "primarily" to deal with
insurance company blacklists of other insurers and agents, while the appellate court
omitted the word "primarily," stating that the boycott exception was designed to reach
the blacklisting situation. Id.
34. Id. at 734-35. This concern that § 1013(b) would nullify the antitrust immunity
granted by the Act unless it were narrowly construed was also raised by the defendants in
Barry. They stated that if policyholders were included within the section's scope, it would
be difficult to conceive of any alleged antitrust violation relating to the insurance contract
or the insurer-insured relationship that could not be pleaded as a "boycott," or as
involving "coercion" or "intimidation." Brief for Appellees at 21, Barry v. St. Paul Fire
& Marine Ins. Co., 555 F.2d 3 (1st Cir.), cert. granted, 98 S. Ct. 391 (1977).
35. 503 F.2d 725 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 929 (1975).
36. 503 F.2d at 726.
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coercion among insurance companies and agents. It was enough for the
Ninth Circuit to consider what class of persons or "business relation-
ship" is protected from acts of coercion by operation of the section. On
that ground alone, it held that Addrisi's claim must be dismissed.37
Thus, while the Fifth Circuit in Meicler was not quite explicit as to
whether its holding could rest solely on the fact that state-regulated rate
fixing was permitted by the McCarran-Ferguson Act, and did not, there-
fore, constitute boycotting within the meaning of the Act's boycott
exception, or whether it must rest also on the interpretation of the Act's
legislative history that only blacklisted companies and agents were in-
tended to have the protection of section 1013(b), the Ninth Circuit in
Addrisi was perfectly clear. Although claiming reliance on Transnation-
al and the district court holding in Meicler,38 the Ninth Circuit went a
step further by ruling that the section could be found inapplicable regard-
less of the substance of the allegation if the claim were brought by
anyone other than an insurance company or agent. Neither of the earlier
cases had explicitly held that dismissal would follow from a mere exami-
nation of the class of persons involved. The holding in Transnational
rested on insufficient evidence of a boycott, and the question of the class
was considered only in dicta.39 In Meicler, the court appeared to confuse
the separate issues of class and lack of evidence of a boycott, and its
holding does not specifically rest on one or the other, but seemingly on
both as if they were one. 40 Unlike the Fifth Circuit's blurred vision in
Meicler, the Ninth Circuit's reasoning in Addrisi is precise, but it is
altogether dependent upon the weak foundation of the Transnational
court's view of the legislative history. In the wake of Meicler and
Addrisi, a number of district courts faced with section 1013(b) antitrust
suits against insurance companies have simply dismissed them on the
ground that this section is to be narrowly applied to protect only insur-
ance companies and agents from blacklisting.
4
'
37. Id. at 729.
38. When the Ninth Circuit decided Addrisi, the Fifth Circuit had not yet affirmed the
lower court's holding in Meicler.
39. 261 F. Supp. at 27.
40. 506 F.2d at 734.
41. See, e.g., Pierucci v. Continental Cas. Co., 418 F. Supp. 704 (W.D. Pa. 1976)
(section only applies to acts of coercion not involving interaction between a company and
its policyholders); McIlhenny v. American Title Ins. Co., 418 F. Supp. 364 (E.D. Pa. 1976)
(section meant to cover narrow area of activity totally foreign to policyholder suit); Royal
Drug Co. v. Group Life & Health Ins. Co., 415 F. Supp. 343 (W.D. Tex. 1976), rev'don
other grounds, 556 F.2d 1375 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. granted, 46 U.S.L.W. 3536 (U.S. Feb.
28, 1978) (No. 77-952) (sole purpose of exception is to protect against issuance of
blacklists naming insurance companies or agents); Seasongood v. K & K Ins. Agency, 414
F. Supp. 698 (E.D. Mo. 1976), rev'd on other grounds, 548 F.2d 729 (8th Cir. 1977)
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Despite the apparent readiness with which the courts have adopted the
Meicler-Addrisi formula for dismissal, some notable exceptions have
occurred. For example, in Battle v. Liberty National Life Insurance
Co.42 the Fifth Circuit held that under section 1013(b) several funeral
homes were entitled to a hearing on the merits of their allegations against
a life insurance company and its wholly owned subsidiary which
contracted for funeral services for holders of the company's burial
insurance.43 While the court did not elaborate on the reasoning behind its
ruling on the boycott exception, it was clearly influenced by the gravity
of the plaintiffs' allegations, which included threats of physical violence
and cancellation of insurance contracts, as well as threats to build funer-
al homes in competition with those operated by the plaintiffs. 44
Similarly, in Ballard v. Blue Shield,45 the Fourth Circuit held that six
West Virginia chiropractors were entitled to use section 1013(b) to assert
antitrust claims against insurance companies which refused to extend
health insurance coverage for chiropractic services. 46 The Ballard court,
like the Battle court, seemed impressed with the plaintiffs' allegations.
Even though the chiropractors' complaint did not use the term "boy-
(legislative history shows the section is to be narrowly applied to blacklisting); Mathis v.
Auto. Club Inter-Ins. Exch., 410 F. Supp. 1037 (W.D. Mo. 1976) (section not applicable to
boycott of policyholders); Mitgang v. Western Title Ins. Co., 1974-2 Trade Cas. 75,322(N.D. Cal. 1974) (boycott exception has a very narrow meaning).
In another line of cases, the courts have not found it necessary to decide whether the
plaintiffs belong to the class of persons protected by § 101 3(b), and have instead grounded
their dismissals on insufficient evidence of boycott. See, e.g., Frankford Hosp. v. Blue
Cross, 554 F.2d 1253 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 186 (1977) (assuming arguendo
that the section applies, no triable issue of material fact exists as to alleged boycott);
Travelers Ins. Co. v. Blue Cross, 481 F.2d 80 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1093 (1973)
(even if antitrust exemption not applicable, no evidence of antitrust violations). But see
Proctor v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 561 F.2d 262 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (section
applicable to plaintiff auto repairers, but evidence of a boycott is insufficient).
42. 493 F.2d 39 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. I110 (1975).
43. 493 F.2d at 51.
44. Id. The plaintiffs in Barry placed great reliance on Battle, which they said stood
for the proposition that:
in a case other than one solely involving the blacklisting of insurance companies
and/or agents by other insurance companies, any preponderant proof of boycott,
coercion, or intimidation on the part of the Defendant insurance companies
would eviscerate the application of those provisions of the McCarran Act which
generally serve to preclude and prohibit federal court antitrust litigation against
so-called "national" insurance companies.
Brief for Appellants at 53, Barry v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 555 F.2d 3 (1st Cir.),
cert. granted, 98 S. Ct. 391 (1977).
45. 543 F.2d 1075 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 1341 (1977).
46. Id. at 1077.
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cott," the Fourth Circuit found that the allegations were sufficient to
charge a boycott in violation of the Sherman Act, thus triggering section
1013(b) of the McCarran-Ferguson Act.4 7 Neither the Fourth Circuit in
Ballard, nor the Fifth Circuit in Battle mentioned the-class of persons
meant to be protected by the boycott exception, a factor which had been
so important to the Ninth Circuit in Addrisi. Rather, they looked directly
to the sufficiency of the plaintiffs' allegations of coercive acts and
concluded in each case that such charges were sufficient to state a
cause of action under section 1013(b). Had the Ninth Circuit's reasoning
in Addrisi been applied to Battle or Ballard, arguably both the funeral
homes and the chiropractors would have been out of court solely be-
cause neither was within the class of persons meant to be protected by
the boycott exception.4 8
II. SECTION 1013(b): A STRAIGHTFORWARD INTERPRETATION
Given the inconsistent and inconclusive precedent concerning the
scope of section 1013(b), the First Circuit initiated a much needed review
of both the case law and the legislative history of the McCarran-Fergu-
son Act. As a result, it has suggested a clearer direction for the future. In
holding that antitrust principles apply to the relationship between the
insured and the insurer under section 1013(b), the First Circuit in Barry
relied on statutory construction buttressed by historical considerations
and public policy. Before analyzing the legislative history, which the
Transnational court had suggested as rationale for confining the section
to the narrow area of certain blacklisting activities, the court first con-
sidered the possible consequences of applying the section to policyhol-
ders. Allowing consumers the protection of the boycott exception would
not, in the court's view, vitiate the McCarran-Ferguson Act. 49 Instead it
believed that the protection afforded the industry by the Act would
remain strong. To illustrate, the court noted that state tax and regulatory
programs would remain protected from challenges based on the dormant
commerce clause, 50 that the industry would continue to be immune from
47. Id. at 1078.
48. See notes 35-38 & accompanying text supra. In Barry, the district court pointed
out that the plaintiffs in Battle were not policyholders, and if there was any inconsistency
between the Fifth Circuit's holding in Battle and its ruling in Meicler, the latter must be
read as implicitly overruling Battle since it was decided a year later. Barry v. St. Paul Fire
& Marine Ins. Co., No. 75-176, slip op. at 12 (D.R.I. Nov. 19, 1975).
49. 555 F.2d at 8. See text accompanying notes 29-31 supra. See also notes 62-63 &
accompanying text infra.
50. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
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federal regulatory statutes other than the Sherman Act, 51 and that not
every Sherman Act violation would fall within the rubric of "boycott,
coercion or intimidation."' 52 Furthermore, the First Circuit found that
allowing consumers a right of action under the section would be in
keeping with the modern trend toward narrowing exceptions to the
general rule favoring free competition. 3 In a brief consideration of
possible unfairness to the industry, which had perhaps come to rely on a
narrow judicial interpretation excluding policyholders from section
1013(b), the court found that this construction of the Act was a relatively
recent one and consequently it was due no special respect based on
longevity. 4 In addition, the Barry court disagreed with the industry's
claim that injecting antitrust principles into dealings between policyhol-
ders and insurers would disrupt state regulatory functions, finding to the
contrary that state regulation would be protected while concerted boy-
cotts against consumers which did not rest on state authority would have
no antitrust immunity. 55
Having thus demonstrated that the inclusion of policyholders within
the scope of section 1013(b) would not have disastrous consequences,
the First Circuit then narrowed its focus to the statutory language of the
51. 555 F.2d at 8. Only the Sherman Act is made applicable through § 1013(b), so the
industry remains immune from attacks under the Clayton and Federal Trade Commission
Acts. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 9. To support this point, the court cited Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428
U.S. 579 (1976) ("state action" exception narrowed); Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421
U.S. 773 (1975) ("learned profession" exception questioned); United States v. Interna-
tional Boxing Club of N.Y., Inc., 348 U.S. 236 (1955) (refusing to extend "baseball"
exemption to boxing); Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384(1951)
(narrow view of "fair trade" exception). Id.
Among commentators calling for reducing the antitrust immunity of the insurance
industry are: L. Hamric, The McCarran-Ferguson Act: A Time for Procompetitive Re-
forms, 29 VAND. L. REV. 1271 (1976); G. Nedrow, The McCarran Act's Antitrust Exemp-
tion for "The Business of Insurance": A Shrinking Umbrella, 43 TENN. L. REV. 329
(1976). See also Note, Insurance Regulation and Antitrust Exemptions: McCarran-Fergu-
son, the Boycott Exception, and the Public Interest, 27 RUTGERS L. REV. 140 (1973). In
addition, both the Federal Trade Commission and the Justice Department have questioned
the industry's immunity. J. Carper, Insurance: Federal Investigators Press Life Insurance
Firms on Overpricing, Hidden Costs, Antitrust, Wash. Post, Oct. 2, 1977, § C, at I, col. 3.
54. 555 F.2d at 7.
55. Id. at 8-9. In the court's view, § 1013(b) merely neutralized the McCarran-Ferguson
Act's grant of antitrust immunity, "leaving intact" the state action doctrine of Parker v.
Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943), which grants antitrust immunity to the states. Indeed, the
court suggested that Parker may have added strength in the insurance field because of the
policies reflected in the McCarran-Ferguson Act. Regulation by the states would be
protected, but concerted boycotts against consumers not resting on state authority would
have no immunity. Id.
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section. It concluded that there was no ambiguity or unworkability in the
statutory language, and that as a result it could see no justification for
probing the legislative history of the Act. 56 The Court construed the
statute as being plainly applicable to any agreement or act of boycott,
and noted that a narrow construction confining the boycott exception to
insurance blacklisting situations was a purely artificial one which could
only be characterized as a judge-made expansion of the McCarran-
Ferguson Act. 57 However, in deference to all the courts that had relied
on the legislative history for a special interpretation of the section, the
court carefully reviewed the Act's history, beginning with the landmark
South-Eastern decision in 1944.58
The First Circuit traced the bill that was to become the McCarran-
Ferguson Act from the time it first passed the Senate until the confer-
ence report was adopted. It noted that on two occasions the language of
the boycott exception was modified, and that each time the result had
been to broaden, not narrow, the scope of the section.59 Although it
acknowledged that at no time during the congressional debates were any
remarks directed toward the possibility of boycotts aimed at consumers,
the First Circuit refused to find this silence a justification for the lower
court's interpretation. Instead, the appellate court reasoned that the
legislative history did not demonstrate a clear intent on the part of
Congress to limit the boycott exception to acts or agreements affecting
the relationships between insurance companies and their competitors
and agents.' The court concluded that absent this clear showing, the
plain meaning of the statutory language, the nation's strong commitment
to a free marketplace, and the substantial antitrust immunity provided by
the Act all combined to support its holding that policyholders were
entitled to the section's protection.61
56. Id. at 9.
57. Id.
58. See notes 20-21 & accompanying text supra.
59. 555 F.2d at 10. See note 27 supra.
60. 555 F.2d at 12.
61. Id. at II. While the court did not press the point, it observed that the words
"boycott, coercion, or intimidation" were traceable to the South-Eastern decision, a case
that involved evidence of threats and boycotts directed against policyholders. According-
ly, it reasoned that boycotts of consumers were not unknown to the drafters of the
McCarran-Ferguson Act. Futher, since the insurance industry participated actively in
drafting the Act, its representatives could have written the boycott exception more
specifically if the intent were to cover only a narrow area of boycotts. Id. While it is true
that South-Eastern involved boycotts of policyholders and that the industry drafted the
bill that became the McCarran-Ferguson Act, it is somewhat questionable to conclude that
the industry's representatives could have drawn the boycott exception more narrowly.
Their original goal had been enactment of a measure granting complete antitrust immunity,
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Although it found that the clear statutory language of section 1013(b)
made resort to legislative history unnecessary, the First Circuit's
meticulous review of the history set in perspective the questionable
foundation upon which the narrow reading of the section had rested.
Judge Campbell dissented, subscribing to the view that the section ex-
cluded policyholders. In an attempt to marshal justifications other than
legislative history to support this position, he suggested that administra-
tive considerations and the possible disruption of state regulatory
policies were appropriate, 62 but he concentrated particularly on the rela-
tionship between the grant of antitrust immunity provided by section
1012 and the exception provided by section 1013(b). The statutory posi-
tioning of the exception after the grant of immunity indicated to Judge
Campbell that it should be construed in a manner complementary to,
rather than subversive of, the major premises of the Act. 63 The majori-
ty's interpretation of section 1013(b), in his view simply reintroduced by
the back door much of the federal antitrust law eliminated by section
1012.6 Although this argument seemed plausible to Judge Campbell, as it
did to earlier courts facing the issue, 65 it failed to consider the meaning to
be accorded the words "boycott, coercion or intimidation." Finding
policyholders entitled to sue insurance companies under the boycott
exception did not decide the question of whether there was sufficient
evidence of forbidden conduct to establish a Sherman Act violation
through section 1013(b) of the McCarran-Ferguson Act. The legislative
history quoted by the majority made it clear that Congress intended to
permit certain agreements and combinations in the insurance industry
which it found to be in the public interest, for example, state-regulated
rating bureaus, but did not intend to permit private unregulated agree-
ments and combinations which were not in that interest. 66 Thus, only if
the courts were to disregard completely this distinction, which lies at the
but opposition in the Senate resulted in the compromise measure that finally passed. For
congressional objections to the earlier bill granting complete immunity, see the minority
views of Senator O'Mahoney in S. REP. No. 1112, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. (1944). For
arguments of the industry in support of complete immunity, see Joint Hearings Before the
Subcomm. of the Comm. on the Judiciary on S. 1362, H.R. 3269, and H.R. 3270, 78th
Cong., Ist & 2d Sess. (1943-44).
62. 555 F.2d at 14-15 (Campbell, J., dissenting). The judge noted that the legislative
history was capable of being argued both ways and that he did not choose to enter this
arena. Instead, he worried about burdening the courts with a new category of antitrust
suit, as well as the potential for conflict between federal antitrust policies and state
regulation. Id. at 15.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 14-15.
65. See note 34 & accompanying text supra.
66. See, e.g., remarks of Senator O'Mahoney, quoted in 555 F.2d at 10-11.
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very heart of the Act, would section 1013(b) let in by the back door the
very antitrust activity section 1012 eliminated.67
The dissent also suggested that the meaning of "boycott" in section
1013(b) must have a different meaning from the use of this same term in
the context of the Sherman Act, since the language in the section did not
follow the broad "contract, combination. . . or conspiracy" language
of the Sherman Act. 68 In support of this view, Judge Campbell stated that
Congress would have used the same language if it had intended the
boycott exception in the McCarran-Ferguson Act to be broadly
construed. 69 The majority, however, disagreed, noting that in antitrust
law a boycott is a "concerted refusal to deal," and that precedent existed
for the proposition that a boycott of consumers is a boycott for antitrust
purposes. 70 There is case authority to support both views 7' and Barry is
not dispositive of this question. However, by eliminating an artificially
narrow interpretation that excluded policyholders as a class from the
section's protection, Barry clears the way for a reasoned consideration
of the meaning of the word "boycott" in section 1013(b).
III. CONCLUSION
Because of a restrictive judicial interpretation of section 1013(b) of the
McCarran-Ferguson Act, policyholders have been unsuccessful in their
efforts to charge insurers with federal antitrust violations. The decision
in Barry narrows the scope of the industry's antitrust immunity by
holding that consumers are not, as a class, automatically excluded from
the section's protection. Courts faced with antitrust suits under section
67. See note 2 supra.
68. 555 F.2d at 14.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 7-8. As authority for the proposition that a boycott of consumers is a boycott
for antitrust purposes, the court cited Washington State Bowling Proprietors Ass'n v.
Pacific Lanes, Inc., 356 F.2d 371, 376 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 963 (1966). Id. at 8
n.4.
71. See, e.g., Monarch Life Ins. Co. v. Loyal Protective Life Ins. Co., 326 F.2d 841
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 952 (1964) (boycott exception covers all boycotts or
agreements to boycott condemned by the Sherman Act); accord, Ballard v. Blue Shield,
543 F.2d 1075 (4th Cir. 1976) (boycotts condemned by Sherman Act are condemned by
McCarran-Ferguson Act); Cooperativa de Seguros Multiples de Puerto Rico v. San Juan,
294 F. Supp. 627 (D.P.R. 1968) (meaning of "boycott" within McCarran-Ferguson Act not
narrower than its meaning under Sherman Act); Professional & Bus. Men's Life Ins. Co.
v. Bankers Life Co., 163 F. Supp. 274 (D. Mont. 1958) (exception in § 1013(b) applies to all
boycotts). But see Proctor v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 561 F.2d 262 (D.C. Cir.
1977) (boycott exception must be applied so as to accommodate the respective purposes of
the antitrust exemption on the one hand, and the boycott exception to this exemption, on
the other).
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1013(b) will have a more difficult job if they follow Barry, however, for
it will no longer be possible to take a short cut to dismissal based on the
class of the plaintiffs. Instead, charges of illegal boycott will have to be
considered on their merits, which has not been the case in policyholder-
insurer antitrust suits to date. The First Circuit's holding suggests the
possibility of a stronger antitrust role in insurance regulation and a
greater opportunity for consumers, through antitrust suits, to participate
in the regulatory process. In the long run, the significance of Barry will
depend on how the courts resolve their differences as to the meaning of
"boycott" in section 1013(b).
Sara Case
COMMUNICATIONS LAW-FCC Lacks Authority to Pro-
mulgate Rules Controlling Content of Cablecast Pro-
graming Unless Such Regulations Promote Objectives
Previously Held Valid in the Regulation of Broadcast Pro-
graming. Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 111 (1977).
It has become judicially commonplace to describe the growth of cable
television as explosive. This growth is reflected not only in the number.
of cable systems,' but also in the continually expanding variety of cable
services. 2 Cable systems first appeared as Community Antenna Televi-
sion (CATV), a system which generally delivered only the signals of
1. The first commercial Community Antenna Television (CATV) system went into
operation in 1950. By 1952, there were 70 systems with a total of 14,000 subscribers. The
number of systems had increased to 640 by 1960 and had reached 2,490 by 1970. In 1977,
the estimated cable television audience was approximately 11,900,000 distributed among
3,801 systems. See TELEVISION DIGEST, INC., TELEVISION FACTBOOK No. 46, at 73a-75a
(1977); LaPierre, Cable Television and the Promise of Programming Diversity, 42 FORD-
HAM L. REV. 25, 29 (1973).
2. Early CATV systems could carry only a few channels, which were usually devoted
to the retransmission of off-the-air television. In contrast, modern cable systems often
have a capacity for over 20 channels, with the potential of carrying up to 80. The large
number of available channels, coupled with the lower cost of transmitting over cable,
make it feasible for a broader spectrum of interests to use television. Moreover, cable
offers such sophisticated services as two-way communication and facsimile transmission
which hold promise for the future. See SLOAN COMMISSION ON CABLE COMMUNICATIONS,
ON THE CABLE: THE TELEVISION OF ABUNDANCE 36-42 (1971) [hereinafter Sloan Report];
R. SMITH, THE WIRED NATION 10-21 (1972); LaPierre, supra note 1, at 31-34.
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distant broadcast stations to rural subscribers.3 Although this provided
television service to many who would not have otherwise received it, the
imported signals often drew audiences away from television stations
which were struggling to establish themselves in rural areas. Conse-
quently, these small broadcasters turned to the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) for protection. But, since the Communications Act
of 19344 did not contemplate the development of CATV, the Commission
was initially hesitant to regulate cable television. As the complaints of
broadcasters mounted, however, the FCC was able to establish a tenu-
ous authority over cable systems based on the medium's close relation-
ship to broadcast television.5 Cable television increasingly is moving
away from strict dependence on over-the-air signals. Today, many sys-
tems originate, or "cablecast," their own programing in direct competi-
tion with broadcast television.6 The recent decision in Home Box Office,
Inc. v. FCC7 indicates that this new manifestation of the cable explosion
may take the medium beyond the Commission's regulatory grasp.
When it became apparent that cable systems would begin selling cable-
cast as well as retransmitted programing to their subscribers, the FCC
feared that nationwide cable networks might one day grow rich enough
to outbid broadcasters for the motion pictures and sports events which
are a staple of advertiser-supported television.8 Hoping to prevent cable
systems from siphoning9 away broadcast television's best programs, the
Commission severely restricted the types of programing a cable system
3. The basic CATV system consists of a large, prominently placed antenna for
capturing the signals of broadcasting stations, an amplifier, and a network of coaxial cable
for delivering the signals to subscribers. It is also possible to transmit directly over a cable
system from a studio, bringing viewers television without any use of the airwaves. See
SMITH, supra note 2, at 10-21. The term "CATV" is usually applied to cable systems
which only retransmit broadcast signals. "Cable television" is used to describe systems
which provide other viewing services as well. See Cable Television Report and Order, 36
F.C.C.2d 143, 144 n.9 (1972).
4. 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-609 (1970).
5. See United States v. Midwest Video Corp., 406 U.S. 649 (1972); United States v.
Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157 (1968).
6. As of Sept. 1, 1976, 2,404 cable systems were engaged in some form of cablecast-
ing. About half of these offered only automatic originations, such as a channel devoted
solely to showing a news wire service teletype. Other systems carry more varied fare
including motion pictures or taped programs. Only 303 systems offer a pay cable channel.
TELEVISION DIGEST, INC., TELEVISION FACTBOOK No. 46, 75a (1977).
7. 567 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 111 (1977).
8. See Memorandum Opinion & Order, 23 F.C.C.2d 825, 827-29 (1970).
9. The Commission coined the term "siphoning" to describe the buying away of
programs from conventional television broadcasters by competing media. Sometimes the
word "migration" is used for the same purpose. See Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567
F.2d 9, 21 n.20 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 111 (1977).
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could carry.' ° Home Box Office, Inc., a company supplying motion
pictures to cablecasters, petitioned the FCC for a waiver of the restric-
tions so that it could release a film over which it had acquired the cable
rights." The Commission denied the petition 12 and Home Box Office
appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit. ' 3
The court held that although the FCC could assert jurisdiction over
cable television under the Communications Act, 14 it could not promul-
gate the rules in question without showing that it was advancing some
regulatory policy either set forth in the Act itself or recognized as a long-
established goal in the field of broadcasting.' 5 In the court's view, none
of the justifications offered by the Commission met these standards.' 6
Accordingly, the programing restrictions were declared invalid as ap-
plied to cable television. The District of Columbia Circuit further warned
that even if the anti-siphoning rules could pass this threshold test, they
10. The rules introduced by the Commission precluded cable systems from exhibiting
feature films which had been in general release for more than two years, but less than ten
years, and from cablecasting live sports events which had been shown over conventional
broadcast television in the previous two years. Other provisions restricted cable systems
from carrying series-type programs, limited the percentage of total programing which
could be devoted to feature films and sports events, and forbid advertising on cable
channels for which a separate fee is charged. See Memorandum Opinion & Order, 23
F.C.C.2d 825, 830-31 (1970).
I1. See Home Box Office, Inc., 51 F.C.C.2d 317 (1975). Home Box Office's main
argument for waiver was that the American Broadcasting Co. had already secured the
broadcast rights to the film so there was no danger that viewers of conventional television
would be prevented from seeing the film. Id. at 318.
12. The FCC refused to grant the waiver absent a showing that the public interest
would benefit. Id. at 322.
13. Jurisdiction for the appeal was based on 47 U.S.C. § 402 (1970) and 28 U.S.C. §
2342(1) (1970) which provide that appeals of FCC orders may be taken to the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.
While the Home Box Office appeal was pending, the Commission announced its general
policy and regulations on cablecast television in the First Report & Order, 52 F.C.C.2d 1
(1975). The new regulations relaxed the film restrictions somewhat, allowing cable
operators to show motion pictures which had been in general.release for up to three years,
but they also tightened the sports rules by forbidding cablecasters from carrying sports
events which had appeared on conventional television in the preceding five years. See 52
F.C.C.2d at 70-72. Various parties appealed these orders, and their petitions were joined
with the Home Box Office case. Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 17-18 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. III (1977).
14. 47 U.$.C. § 152(a) (1970) provides that provisions of the Act will be applied to all
interstate communications by wire.
15. 567 F.2d at 28.
16. The FCC argued that it had a duty to maintain the current level of program quality
on conventional television and that broadcasting generally deserved protection because it
is the superior form of television service. Id. at 28-29.
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would probably still run afoul of the first amendment, since the FCC's
traditional authority to limit program content in the public interest could
only operate if the communicator was using the broadcast spectrum.' 7
I. CABLE, THE COMMISSION, AND THE COURTS
At least some of the credit for cable television's rapid expansion
should go to the FCC, whose policies may have inadvertently touched
off the cable explosion. In 1948, when television was still largely an
urban phenomenon, the Commission put an indefinite freeze on new
broadcast licenses 18 while it developed a better channel distribution plan.
Although the action halted the spread of the new medium, 19 the demand
for television continued to increase and before long, the first community
antenna systems were erected to bring television to those areas beyond
the reach of existing stations. 20 The CATV idea spread quickly. There
were seventy systems operating by 195221 when the freeze was lifted and
the new table of channel assignments was announced. The end of the
licensing freeze, however, did not mean an end to CATV. Under the new
allocation plan, most VHF channels were allotted to cities, 22 leaving less
populous areas with UHF frequencies which are more difficult to trans-
mit. 23 The resulting situation inhibited the development of rural televi-
sion and preserved a market for cable systems.
17. Id. at 43-51.
18. Report & Order (F.C.C. 48-2182, Sept. 30, 1948).
19. Under the Commission's original plan, television would only be broadcast on VHF
frequencies. See Public Notice (June 27, 1946), reprinted in 39 F.C.C. 236 (1970). These
channels (at that time VHF was limited to channels 1-13) were distributed according to a
table of assignments which included only the 140 largest markets in the United States. See
47 C.F.R. § 3.606 (Supp. 1945) (current version at 47 C.F.R. § 73.606(b) (1976)).
Applicants for stations outside these areas were required to show that their use of a
channel would not interfere with any existing or future station. See 47 C.F.R. § 3.605
(Supp. 1945) (current version at 47 C.F.R. § 73.607 (1976)).
20. The first commercial CATV was erected by Robert J. Tarlton in Lansford, Pa., a
small town in hilly country approximately 65 miles from Philadelphia. Tarlton had been
selling television sets and hoped the system would stimulate demand for this product. See
SMITH, supra note 2, at 3-4. A noncommercial CATV had been erected earlier in a
mountainous area of Oregon. See La Pierre, supra note 1, at 29 n. 19.
21. See TELEVISION DIGEST, INC., TELEVISION FACTBOOK No. 46, 75a (1977).
22. See Sixth Report & Order, (Apr. 11, 1952), reprinted in 41 F.C.C. 148 (1970).
23. There are several difficulties involved in UHF broadcasting. Since more energy is
required to generate and broadcast the higher frequencies, the UHF station operator will
need a more powerful transmitter than his VHF counterpart. A UHF wave will dissipate
its transmission energy faster than the VHF wave, thus limiting the distance over which it
can be broadcast. In addition, the higher UHF frequencies tend to bounce off obstacles
rather than curving around them, thus further restricting their range. See Sloan Report,
supra note 2, at 15-20.
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By the late fifties, broadcast television was making considerable head-
way outside the cities, but new broadcasters found CATV an unexpected
source of audience competition. It was not unusual for viewers to prefer
the variety of big-city stations brought by CATV to the limited fare
offered by local stations. In Frontier Broadcasting Co. v. Collier,24
several broadcasters in this predicament petitioned the FCC to declare
CATV systems common carriers within the meaning of the Communica-
tions Act 25 and to adopt rules governing CATV operations. This pro-
posed basis of jurisdiction was unacceptable to the Commission since,
unlike traditional common carriers, the CATV operator had more control
over the content of transmissions than his customer. 26 The FCC did
subsequently conduct a more extensive inquiry into the CATV problem,
although the resulting Report and Order on CA TV and TV Repeater
Services27 merely reiterated the conclusion that CATV systems were
outside the Commission's authority. During the CATV hearings, several
new theories of jurisdiction were advanced, but all were rejected since
they required either an extremely broad interpretation of the FCC's
power or a redefinition of broadcasting to include CATV systems. 28
24. 24 F.C.C. 251 (1958).
25. Under 47 U.S.C. § 201 (1970), the Commission is empowered to regulate the
charges and practices of common carriers engaged in interstatb communications.
26. In the FCC's view, a common carrier supplied a means of communications and
only transmitted matter which its customers requested. Although to some extent, a CATV
system carried programing favored by its subscribers, the Commission found it significant
that the final choice of material rested solely with the system operator. Frontier Broad-
casting Co. v. Collier, 24 F.C.C. 251, 253-55 (1958).
27. 26 F.C.C. 403 (1959).
28. Four possible bases for jurisdiction were considered in the report:
I. CATV systems as common carriers: The Commission, however, affirmed
its prior holding in Frontier Broadcasting that CATV systems could not be
properly classified as common carriers.
2. CATV systems as persons engaged in broadcasting: In the FCC's view,
however, broadcasting required that the medium of transmission be radio
waves, not cable.
3. Under the Commission's "plenary power" over communications: Sub-
paragraph (r) of § 303 of the Communications Act empowers the FCC to
make such laws as necessary to carry out the aims of the Act. 47 U.S.C.
§ 303(r) (1970). The Commission, however, did not believe that this power
extended to all enterprises having a nexus with the communications field.
4. Under the Commission's power to prevent the rebroadcast of signals: The
Communications Act forbids stations from rebroadcasting the signals of
other stations without permission. 47 U.S.C. § 325(a) (1970). It was argued
that this section of the statute gave the FCC authority to prevent any reuse
of broadcast signals. The Commission disagreed, believing that its authori-
ty was confined to actual rebroadcasting, as opposed to retransmission
through cable.
See Report & Order on CATV and TV Repeater Services, 26 F.C.C. 403, 427-31 (1959).
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Several years later, however, when stronger evidence that CATV
competition could undermine a broadcast station was presented, the
result was somewhat different. In Carter Mountain Transmission
Corp. ,29 the Commission found a way to regulate cable systems indirect-
ly. KWRB television, a broadcaster serving an area of Wyoming in
conjunction with several CATV systems, demonstrated that it had only
begun drawing large audiences when it started delivering a better picture
over the air than viewers could pick up from the cable. 30 The station
claimed that this competitive advantage would disappear if the CATV
systems were able to take their distant signals from the microwave relay
that the Commission had given Carter Mountain Transmission Corpora-
tion permission to build.3' On this evidence, the FCC withdrew Carter
Mountain's microwave license until the company could show that none
of the CATV systems planning to use the proposed facility would dupli-
cate KWRB's programing.32 Carter Mountain appealed the ruling,3 3 argu-
ing that the first amendment prohibited the Commission from placing
such restraints on the use of a communications instrument. 34 The argu-
ment, however, did not convince the District of Columbia Circuit, which
held that the restrictions fell within the FCC's traditional licensing pow-
er. The court based its view on the general proposition that any form of
radio transmission involves the use of a scarce resource-the elec-
tromagnetic spectrum-which, pursuant to the Communications Act,
should only be licensed when the "public interest, convenience and
necessity" will be served.35 In the past, this spectrum scarcity rationale
29. 32 F.C.C. 459 (1962).
30. Id. at 462-64.
31. A microwave relay would pick up broadcast signals at a point close to their location
and beam them directly to the CATV. Under this system, the signals would suffer less
interference than if they were received over the usual community antenna. See Report &
Order on CATV and TV Repeater Services, 26 F.C.C. 403, 409 (1959).
32. The Commission was convinced that KWRB's demise would be inevitable since
the station was already in a precarious financial situation. The disappearance of KWRB
would deprive its service area of its only source of locally oriented programing and would
mean a total loss of television to those areas in which it would be uneconomical to run
cable. The economic hardship of KWRB thus assumed the proportions of an injury to the
public interest. See Carter Mountain Transmission Corp., 32 F.C.C. 459, 464-65 (1962).
Cf. Carrol Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 258 F.2d 440 (D.C. Cir. 1958) (economic injury to
existing broadcaster not relevant to new license application unless threat to public interest
involved).
33. Carter Mountain Transmission Corp. v. FCC, 321 F.2d 359 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 375 U.S. 951 (1963).
34. The company argued that its customers had the right to use the facility freely
regardless of the competitive impact of their messages. Id. at 364.
35. Id. (citing National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 227 (1943)).
The D.C. Circuit did not engage in a lengthy discussion of spectrum scarcity. It merely
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had been used to authorize various restrictions on broadcast content
when the public interest was threatened. 36 In this case, the public interest
was identified with the locally-oriented programing which KWRB alone
provided and, in order to protect this public benefit, the court was willing
to allow the FCC to regulate the content of Carter Mountain's transmis-
sions. 37 ,
Armed with the Carter Mountain decision, the FCC began restricting
the signals that all microwave relay systems could sell to CATV sys-
tems. 38 Broadcast interests complained that they still faced a con-
siderable audience-splitting threat from cable systems which did not use
microwave feeds. 39 The Commission responded by applying the nondup-
lication requirements directly to CATV systems regardless of the method
by which they received their signals." ° Jurisdiction for the new rules
depended on a finding that cable systems were engaged in "interstate
communication by wire" and were therefore subject to the FCC's au-
thority under the Communications Act.4 ' The restrictions on signals
carried were justified as necessary to protect the system of television
broadcasting the Commission had licensed. 42 When the FCC began issu-
noted that although FCC licensing requirements may keep some communication off the
air, they do not unconstitutionally deny free speech when the applicant fails to meet the
standard of public interest, convenience, and necessity. Id. In National Broadcasting
Co., the Supreme Court had stated that:
Freedom of utterance is abridged to many who wish to use the limited facilities of
radio. Unlike other modes of expression, radio inherently is not available to all.
That is its unique characteristic, and that is why, unlike other modes of expres-
sion, it is subject to governmental regulation. Because it cannot be used by all,
some who wish to use it must be denied.
319 U.S. at 226. See also Hoffer, The Power of the FCC to Regulate Cable Pay-TV:
Jurisdictional and Constitutional Limitations, 53 DEN. L.J. 477, 491-92 (1976).
36. At issue in National Broadcasting Co. were regulations which limited the amount
of network programing a radio station could carry. The Commission felt that the broadcas-
ters' dependence on the networks was inhibiting the growth of locally responsive pro-
graming. 319 U.S. at 202-04. This spectrum scarcity argument was used most recently to
uphold the FCC's fairness doctrine. 47 C.F.R. § 73.123 (1976). See Red Lion Broadcasting
Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 387-89 (1969).
37. Carter Mountain Transmission Corp. v. FCC, 321 F.2d 359, 364 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 375 U.S. 951 (1963).
38. The regulations would have allowed microwave licensees to enter into contracts
only with CATV systems which carried the signals of all the stations in whose broadcast
contours they operated and which did not duplicate the programing of local stations in the
other signals they carried. See First Report & Order, 38 F.C.C. 683, 741-46 (1965).
39. See Notice of Inquiry & Proposed Rulemaking, 1 F.C.C.2d 453 (1965).
40. See Second Report & Order, 2 F.C.C.2d 725 (1966).
41. 47 U.S.C. § 152(a) (1970) states that provisions of the Act will apply "to all
interstate and foreign communications by wire." See Second Report & Order, 2 F.C.C.2d
725, 729 (1966).
42. Under 47 U.S.C. § 303(h) (1970), the Commission has the authority to "establish
areas or zones to be served by any (broadcast) stations." 47 U.S.C. § 312(b) (1970) gives
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ing cease and desist orders pursuant to these new rules, however, its
authority was immediately challenged and eventually argued before the
Supreme Court in United States v. Southwestern Cable Co.4 3 The CATV
interests in Southwestern Cable did not deny that they were engaged in
interstate communication by wire, but urged that since cable systems
were neither common carriers nor broadcasters they were not properly
subject to the Communications Act." The Supreme Court held that the
Act could not be read so narrowly. 45 In the Court's view, the Commis-
sion must be allowed to issue CATV orders which are "reasonably
ancillary" to the performance of its other duties under the Communica-
tions Act. 46 The Court noted that one of the FCC's primary duties is to
provide a fair distribution of television service throughout the country. 47
Accepting the Commission's judgment that audience fragmentation
caused by CATV systems was a genuine threat to the FCC's ability to
provide such a system, 48 the Court approved the cease and desist order
the FCC the power to issue cease and desist orders to anyone who fails to observe a
Commission regulation. The Commission construed this to mean that it had the power to
prevent CATV systems from taking broadcast signals beyond their designated contours.
See Second Report & Order, 2 F.C.C.2d 725, 729 (1966).
43. 392 U.S. 157 (1968). Midwest Television, Inc.,-owner of a San Diego broadcasting
station, had petitioned the FCC to prevent several San Diego CATV systems, including
Southwestern Cable Company, from importing the signals of Los Angeles stations. See
Memorandum Opinion & Order, 4 F.C.C.2d 612 (1966). On appeal, the Ninth Circuit held
that the Commission could not bring a cease and desist order against entities which it had
not licensed. Southwestern Cable Co. v. United States, 378 F.2d 118, 123 (9th Cir. 1967),
rev'd, 392 U.S. 157 (1968).
44. The FCC had already ruled that CATV systems were neither engaged in broadcast-
ing nor functioning as common carriers. See notes 24-27 & accompanying text supra. This
finding would exempt CATV systems from the major provisions of the Communications
Act. See United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. at 171-72.
45. Id. at 172.
46. Id. at 178. The Court felt that in this instance the achievement of the agency's
ultimate purpose was at stake. Id. at 177. The Court, however, emphasized that the FCC's
authority over cable was "restricted to that reasonably ancillary to the effective perform-
ance of the Commission's various responsibilities for the regulation of television broad-
casting." Id. at 178.
47. Id. at 173-74. The Court drew support for this policy from the Communications Act
itself. See 47 U.S.C. § 307(b) (1970) (The Commission shall grant licenses so "as to
provide a fair, efficient distribution" of service among "the several States and
communities"). It was also felt that the congressionally approved policy of encouraging
education and UHF stations was involved, since these stations would be particularly
vulnerable to the audience-splitting effects of unregulated CATV systems. See 392 U.S. at
174-76.
48. The Court did not require the Commission to demonstrate conclusively that unre-
gulated CATV growth would cause the collapse of broadcast television; rather it was
satisfied that substantial evidence on the record showed that authority over cable
communication was necessary for the Commission to fulfill its broadcast duties. Id. at
176-77.
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issued to Southwestern Cable Company.49
Even though the Supreme Court upheld the jurisdictional basis of the
CATV regulations, the validity of the rules themselves were only con-
sidered at the circuit court level. The decisions in Buckeye Cablevision,
Inc. v. FCC50 and Black Hills Video Corp. v. FCC51 exemplify the circuit
court approaches to the first amendment implications of the regula-
tions.5 2 In both cases, cable companies challenged the constitutionality
of the cable restrictions and, in each opinion, their claims were rejected
with only brief discussion. In Buckeye, the District of Columbia Circuit
held that the distant signal rules imposed no more restraint "than is
reasonably required to effectuate the public interest requirements of the
(Communications) Act. ' ' 5" The court ostensibly based its holding on
Carter Mountain, although the spectrum scarcity underpinnings of that
decision are difficult to analogize to cable transmissions which are car-
ried over wire rather than airwaves.5 4 In Black Hills, the Eighth Circuit
similarly decided that first amendment objections could be overridden in
the public interest, but went a step further, calling it irrelevant that
CATV systems did not use the airwaves.5 5 In its view, all that mattered
was that CATV systems used radio signals and had a potentially adverse
affect on broadcast television.56
49. Justice White concurred in the result, although, in his opinion, the FCC had
sufficient authority under §§ 301 and 303 of the Act to issue the cease and desist order in
question. Id. at 181-82. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 301 (granting broad authority over broadcasting)
and 303 (allowing the FCC to make regulations necessary to prevent interference between
broadcast stations) (1970).
50. 387 F.2d 220 (D.C. Cir. 1967). Buckeye was an appeal of a cease and desist order.
Buckeye Cablevision, Inc., 3 F.C.C.2d 798 (1966). The case was decided before South-
western Cable and was noted in that opinion. See United States v. Southwestern Cable
Co., 392 U.S. 157, 161 n.7 (1968).
51. 399 F.2d 65 (8th Cir. 1968).
52. Although the rules were considered by other circuit courts, those decisions general-
ly relied upon Buckeye and Black Hills. See, e.g., Total Telecable, Inc. v. FCC, 411 F.2d
639 (9th Cir. 1969); Titusville Telecable TV, Inc. v. United States, 404 F.2d 1187 (3d Cir.
1968); Conley Elect. Corp. v. FCC, 394 F.2d 620 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 858
(1968).
53. 387 F.2d at 225.
54. The D.C. Circuit did not analyze the spectrum scarcity rationale in the cable
television context, but merely held that Carter Mountain and National Broadcasting Co.
were sufficient authority for the rules in question. Id. nn. 21 & 23.
55. 399 F.2d at 69. Petitioners in Black Hills were microwave-served CATV systems,
so the first amendment issue involved the grant of a license. The Eighth Circuit, however,
did not confine its discussion to the rights of microwave operators but also considered the
problem from the CATV operators' viewpoint. Id.
56. Id. The Eighth Circuit cited no authority for this, but seemed to rely on Southwest-
ern Cable which had recently been decided and appeared to indicate that the FCC could
fully regulate CATV systems as long as they posed a threat to broadcast television. See
note 47 supra.
Casenotes
It was not long before the FCC moved to expand its authority over
CATV. Although the earlier cable regulation was intended solely to
protect broadcasters, the Commission subsequently acted to require
cable systems to provide the diversified programing and outlets for local
expression that it had always sought in broadcast television.5 7 These
goals were to be achieved by compelling larger cable systems to begin
originating their own programs. 58 In the FCC's view, this requirement
would serve the public interest and provide an appropriate quid pro quo
for cable television's continued use of broadcast signals. 59 As might be
expected, the rules were challenged by cable interests. But in United
States v. Midwest Video Corp.60 the Supreme Court again upheld the
Commission, albeit by a narrower margin. A plurality 6' held that the
origination requirements fell within the "reasonably ancillary" standard
of Southwestern Cable since they furthered "the achievement of long-
established regulatory goals in the field of television broadcasting.' '62
Chief Justice Burger concurred in the judgment, but only because he felt
it inappropriate to review an agency policy decision. 63 He admitted,
however, that he would prefer the Commission to base its policies on
congressional mandate and characterized the existing rules as straining
the outer limits of the FCC's judicially approved authority over cable
television.'
While Midwest Video advanced through the courts, the Commission
moved to counter what it perceived as another of cable's potential
57. See First Report & Order, 20 F.C.C.2d 201 (1969).
58. The .rules introduced in the new order precluded cable systems with over 3,500
subscribers from carrying broadcast signals unless the system also operated "to a signifi-
cant extent as a local outlet" and maintained facilities for production and exhibition of
programming. 20 F.C.C.2d at 223. These cablecasts would be subject to FCC broadcast
rules such as the fairness doctrine, 47 C.F.R. § 73.123 (1976). See 20 F.C.C.2d at 223-25.
59. 20 F.C.C.2d at 208-09.
60. 406 U.S. 649 (1972).
61. Justice Brennan wrote an opinion in which Justices White, Marshall, and Blackmun
joined. Justice Douglas wrote a dissenting opinion in which Justices Stewart, Powell, and
Rehnquist joined. The deciding vote was cast by Chief Justice Burger in a concurring
opinion.
62. 406 U.S. at 667-68. The plurality noted that the cablecasts mandated by the rules
would not use the broadcast spectrum. Nevertheless, since the effect of the regulations
was to provide viewers of retransmitted television with diversified programing, the rules
were reasonably ancillary to the FCC's broadcast duties. Id. at 669.
63. Id. at 676. The Chief Justice did not necessarily think the rules unfair, feeling that
the use of broadcast signals should make CATV systems subject to FCC regulation. Id.
64. Until Congress acted on the matter, the Chief Justice advocated giving the FCC
some latitude in regulating cable television. Id. Justice Douglas, speaking for the dissent-
ers, complained that the plurality was giving the FCC more power over cable television
under the reasonably ancillary standard than the Commission had over broadcast televi-
sion under the Communications Act. Id. at 681.
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threats to broadcast television. Ironically, the new threat came from the
cablecast programing the FCC had tried to foster in its Midwest Video
rules. 65 Cable operators were beginning to show motion pictures and
sports events over channels that subscribers could view by paying an
extra fee.' The Commission feared that if cable systems acquired a large
enough audience for the service, they would be able to outbid the
networks for this type of programing, with a consequent lowering in the
overall quality of broadcast television. 67 Similar fears had motivated the
FCC to place severe restrictions on the kind of material over-the-air pay
television could carry, 68 and it now imposed the same limits on "pay
cable" programing. 69 The pay television rules had already withstood
judicial scrutiny in National Association of Theatre Owners v. FCC,70
but that opinion could provide no more than arguable support for pay
cable rules. 71 Though similar to the cable service, pay television stations
use the airwaves 72 and, therefore, must be licensed by the Commission.
Any first amendment objections to the pay television rules could proper-
65. The FCC curtailed many of the origination requirements soon after the Midwest
decision. See Clarification of Cable Television Rules, 46 F.C.C.2d 176 (1974). See general-
ly Price, Requiem for the Wired Nation: Cable Rulemaking at the FCC, 61 VA. L. REV. 541
(1975).
66. There are several methods for distributing cable programs for a fee. In some
systems, the programing is transmitted on a channel which television sets cannot normally
receive. The subscriber is supplied with a device to enable his set to receive these
channels.. Other systems allow the subscriber to pay for only the programs actually
viewed. See First Report & Order, 52 F.C.C.2d 1, 2 (1975).
67. See Memorandum Opinion & Order, 23 F.C.C.2d 825, 827-28 (1970).
68. The pay television rules prohibited such stations from showing films which had
been in general release for more than two but less than ten years and from broadcasting
sports events which had been televised on a regular basis on conventional stations in the
preceding two years. Other provisions banned advertising and series-type programs on
subscriptidn television and limited the amount of programing which could be devoted to
films and sports events. See Fourth Report & Order, 15 F.C.C.2d 466, 597-98 (1968). The
Commission considered the possibility that cable systems might also originate pay pro-
graming, but at the time of the Fourth Report & Order, did not feel it had the authority to
regulate such systems. See 15 F.C.C.2d at 583-87.
69. See Memorandum Opinion & Order, 23 F.C.C.2d 825, 830-31 (1970).
70. 420 F.2d 194 (D.C. Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 922 (1970).
71. National Ass'n of Theatre Owners involved a petition for review of the Fourth
Report & Order, 15 F.C.C.2d 466 (1968), brought by a group representing motion picture
exhibitors. The theater owners, viewing pay television as a threat to their business,
challenged the FCC's power to license such a system of broadcasting. The D.C. Circuit,
noting that the Communications Act encouraged new uses of the broadcast spectrum,
approved the Commission's authorization of pay television. 420 F.2d at 200-02. First
amendment objections to the rules themselves were raised by the exhibitors, but the court
felt the restrictions necessary to insure the financial stability of conventional television
and to guarantee diversity in the programing available to all viewers. 420 F.2d at 207-08.
72. Pay television is broadcast on a scrambled signal which only specially equipped
television sets can receive. See 420 F.2d at 195 n.I.
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ly be countered by the "spectrum scarcity" 73 argument. It was, there-
fore, questionable whether the result would be the same with pay cable,
in which the broadcast spectrum is not a factor.
II. HOME Box OFFICE V. FCC
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit examined the pay cable rules from several perspectives, but in
each instance found them beyond the FCC's power. 74 Although courts
have generally construed the Commission's jurisdiction over the rapidly
developing communications industry broadly, 75 the court in Home Box
Office warned that this authority is not open-ended.7 6 The Commission's
use of its power to prevent virtually any competition from pay cable
systems for film and sports programs made the District of Columbia
Circuit even more circumspect. 77 In the court's opinion, past Supreme
Court interpretations of the FCC's cable authority were both expansive
and narrow. Southwestern Cable recognized the Commission's juris-
diction over cable television but narrowly construed its power to promul-
gate regulations which were "reasonably ancillary" to its other regulato-
ry duties. 78 Midwest Video expanded the list of permissible objectives to
include ends for which the FCC might also regulate broadcasting. 79 None
of the Commission's justifications for the pay cable rules, however,
were deemed to fall within the standards which evolved from those
73. For an explanation of spectrum scarcity, see notes 34 & 35 & accompanying text
supra.
74. Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. I 11
(1977).
75. See, e.g., United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 172 (1968);
National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 217 (1943); FCC v. Pottsville
Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134, 138 (1940).
76. Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. I 11
(1977).
77. Under the film rules, pay cable entrepreneurs were not allowed to exhibit a motion
picture that had been in general release for more then three but less than ten years. First
Report & Order, 52 F.C.C.2d 1, 69 (1975). The average age of films shown on network
television for the first time, however, is around five years. Id. at 26. Broadcasters would
thus have no competition for the films they generally show. The court noted also that
waivers of the rules would be granted only when the cable operator could show that the
film desired was unsuitable for conventional television, a requirement it felt was further
evidence of the anti-competitive nature of the rules. Home Box Office, Inc. v. F.C.C.,
567 F.2d 9, 28 n.46 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 111 (1977).
78. The court emphasized that all the regulatory duties involved in Southwestern Cable
enjoyed considerable congressional approval. Id. at 26 n.43; see note 47 & accompanying
text supra.
79. The Home Box Office court confined the list of permissible objectives to those
specifically approved in Midwest Video: the "enhancement of local service" and the
"diversification of control of available television and cable programing." d. at 27; see
note 62 & accompanying text supra.
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cases. The FCC contended that past judicial interpretations of the
Communications Act compelled the agency to protect advertiser-financ-
ed broadcasting.8" It pointed to the approval of the pay television restric-
tions in National Association of Theatre Owners as recognition of
conventional television's preferred status. 81 The Home Box Office court
disputed this reading of the case. In its view, the only construction of the
Communications Act involved in National Association of Theatre Own-
ers leaned in the opposite direction, since the court had found that the
Act encouraged the alternative form of broadcasting.
2
The FCC's other argument, although related somewhat to the first,
was more difficult to dismiss because it drew support from the circuit's
previous opinions. Basically, the Commission alleged that the overall
level of public program enjoyment would decline if the televising of
motion pictures and sports events was limited to subscription cablecast-
ing.83 Thus, the public interest required the FCC to take steps to prevent
such reduction. 84 The Commission inferred this obligation from a line of
cases in which the District of Columbia Circuit had instructed it to
consider certain factors, such as possible loss of unique programing
80. During oral argument, counsel for the FCC urged that the Communications Act
itself required the favoring of free broadcast television. Counsel argued that the agency
was mandated by statute "to make available . . . a rapid, efficient, nation-wide, and
world-wide wire and radio communication service." 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1970). Since cable
television will only reach those willing to pay for it, the FCC contended that conventional
broadcasting would be the optimal method of television distribution. The court, however,
was not convinced that program siphoning posed a significant threat to the Commission's
ability to provide a nationwide communications system. Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC,
567 F.2d 9, 33-34 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 98 S Ct. 111 (1977).
81. Id. at 32-33.
82. Id. at 33. Further support for a policy of favoritism might be inferred from
Southwestern Cable since the restrictions approved in that case were intended to protect
broadcast television. The FCC seemed to adopt this position when it asserted that the
regulation of cable operations to prevent them from "depriving the public of the various
benefits of local broadcasting stations would come within the 'reasonably ancillary'
standard." Brief for Appellee at 26-27, Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 111 (1977) (quoting United States v. Southwestern Cable Co.,
392 U.S. 157, 175 (1967)). The D.C. Circuit, however, responded that Southwestern Cable
would be inapposite in this context since the Commission had in no way alleged that
program siphoning would result in the demise of broadcast television stations, a major
consideration in that prior case. 567 F.2d at 27-28.
83. Id. at 35-36. The Commission saw films and sports events as essential to conven-
tional television, since it was through these programs that broadcasters would attract the
mass audiences needed to sell advertising. See Brief for Appellee at 10, Home Box Office,
Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 111 (1977); First Report &
Order, 52 F.C.C.2d 1, 43 (1975).
84. 567 F.2d at 28-29.
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service, when passing on requests to transfer radio station licenses. 85
The Home Box Office court noted, however, that the FCC had generally
refused to follow these holdings because it regarded inquiries into pro-
gram content as beyond its authority under the Communications Act.8 6
Moreover, the Commission had expressed the view that it was incapable
of dealing with such a subjective consideration. 87 The court, therefore,
reasoned that if the FCC was incompetent to deal with these matters in
regulating broadcasting, it was likewise incompetent in the area of cable
programing. 88
Although the pay cable rules were invalidated on the grounds that they
exceeded the Commission's cable authority, the court also analyzed the
first amendment consequences of the regulations. 89 Observing that sub-
stantially the same rules had been approved for pay television in Nation-
al Association of Theatre Owners, it distinguished that decision because
it had not been based on first amendment grounds. Instead, the court
characterized that decision as being restricted solely to the issue of
whether the granting of a broadcasting license could be conditioned on
the nature of the programing planned by the applicant.' This characteri-
zation placed the National Association of Theatre Owners decision firm-
ly in line with other licensing cases in which the exigencies of spectrum
scarcity had allowed the Commission discretion in regulating program
content in the public interest.9' In contrast, at least two CATV opinions,
Buckeye Cablevision and Black Hills Video, had expressly granted the
FCC's cable rules the same first amendment status as its broadcast
85. See Citizens Comm. to Save WEFM v. FCC, 506 F.2d 246, 260 (D.C. Cir. 1974);
Citizens Comm. to Keep Progressive Rock v. FCC, 478 F.2d 926 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Citizens
Comm. v. FCC, 436 F.2d 263 (D.C. Cir. 1970). In each of these cases, radio stations with
unique programing in their areas were being sold to persons who intended to change the
station format.
86. 567 F.2d at 31.
87. Id. at 41; see also Memorandum Opinion & Order, 60 F.C.C.2d 858, 862 (1976).
88. 567 F.2d at 31. There is evidence that the Home Box Office court was somewhat
disenchanted with the Citizens Comm. holdings. See Citizens Comm. to Save WEFM v.
FCC, 506 F.2d 246, 269-84 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (Bazelon, C.J., concurring).
89. 567 F.2d at 43-51. The court felt that its jurisdictional objections could be cured by
a more convincing showing of need for the regulations. Id. at 39-40. Nevertheless, in
order to avoid multiple remands, the D.C. Circuit outlined its other reservations, which
included the lack of evidence on the actual existence of siphoning and FCC's failure to
consider the anti-competitive effects of the rules. Id. at 37-39, 43.
90. Id. at 43.
91. Id. at 43-44. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 394 (1969);
National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 216 (1943); Carter Mountain
Transmission Corp. v. FCC, 321 F.2d 359, 364 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 951
(1963).
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rules.92 The Home Box Office court, however, distinguished both cases.
It observed that Buckeye had been based on Carter Mountain, a case
which dealt solely with the grant of a microwave license and failed to
address the first amendment issue from a cable perspective. 93 Likewise,
the Black Hills decision had been based on Buckeye, although it rein-
forced its holding by stating that the use of broadcast signals alone was
sufficient to invoke complete FCC jurisdiction.94 The Home Box Office
court found this latter rationale to be equally unpersuasive because it
assumed that the FCC "owns" the broadcast spectrum in the same
manner that the government owns parks, sidewalks, and natural re-
sources. 95 The court noted that public ownership of those facilities does
not give the government the right to condition their enjoyment on ideas
the user might express and doubted that the FCC could claim any more
authority than the public in this regard.'
The Home Box Office court did not hold that the first amendment
would bar any FCC regulation affecting cable program content. It did
believe, however, that such rules would have to be tested by the same
criteria as any other law affecting speech-related conduct, a test which
the pay cable rules in their present form did not come close to satisfy-
ing. 97 The court conceded that the Commission's intent in promulgating
92. See Black Hills Video Corp. v. FCC, 399 F.2d 65, 69 (8th Cir. 1968); Buckeye
Cablevision, Inc. v. FCC, 387 F.2d 220, 225 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
93. 567 F.2d at 45 n.80.
94. See Black Hills Video Corp. v. FCC, 399 F.2d 65, 69 (8th Cir. 1968).
95. 567 F.2d at 45 n.80.
96. Id. See, e.g., Police Dept. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 926 (1972) (city ordinance allowing
only peaceful picketers to use sidewalk held violative of equal protection).
97. 567 F.2d at 46-48. The D.C. Circuit used the test developed in United States v.
O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), which involved a federal law forbidding the burning of draft
cards. Although the Supreme Court did not consider draft card burning an expressive act,
it held that the law would not infringe on first amendment rights provided that: (1) its
purpose was unrelated to the suppression of speech; (2) it furthered an important govern-
ment interest; and (3) any incidental restriction on speech was no greater than necessary to
the furtherance of that interest. 391 U.S. at 376-77. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v.
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 770-71 (1976); Procunier v.
Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 411 (1974). The Home Box Office court never expressly held that
the transmission of films or sports events over cable was protected by the first amend-
ment. At one point, the court alluded to "speech of cablecasters" but quickly noted that
the rules do not affect "traditional broadcast modes of persuasive speech such as news
broadcasts or editorials." 567 F.2d at 49. Cable interests urged that the Supreme Court
had recognized the exhibition of motion pictures as a protected activity in Joseph Burstyn,
Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952). See 567 F.2d at 46 n.83. Burstyn, however involved
the outright banning of a film so that the rights of the public and the producer were also
implicated. The pay cable rules would not prevent a producer of films from reaching the
public; but would only affect the means by which he did it. Id. at 49. The O'Brien test
however, may still apply since the affected conduct need only be arguably speech-related.
391 U.S. at 376.
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the rules was not to regulate program content, but rather to protect the
interests of viewers who could not afford a cable hook-up. 98 Concluding
that the Commission's purpose was proper, the court further required it
to show that the pay cable regulations advance a substantial government
interest and infringe on speech-related conduct to no greater degree than
necessary. 99 In order to fulfill these requirements, the Commission
would first have to convince the court that program siphoning is a
problem of significant proportions and that the FCC is mandated by
statute to correct it. " Then the Commission would further be required
to show that the rules were narrowly drawn to exclude from cable only
those programs essential to viewer enjoyment of broadcast television. 101
Broadly stated rules similar to the ones proposed could only pass
scrutiny if they insured that material not actually broadcast was made
immediately available to cablecasters. 102 More specific rules, clearly
relating the restrictions to the maintenance of television quality, might
stand a better chance. 103 The court warned, however, that any prior
restraint on speech, no matter how carefully drawn, would be heavily
disfavored. 104
III. CABLE REGULATION AFTER HOME Box OFFICE
Under the guidelines set forth in Home Box Office, the FCC would
probably have to monitor continually programs being shown on broad-
cast television to guarantee that pay cable television is supplied with all
98. 567 F.2d at 48.
99. Id. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377.
100. 567 F.2d at 49-50. The court felt that the FCC had failed on both points. The
Commission had relied on a mathematical model to prove that pay cable would have
enough income by 1980 to outbid broadcasters for available programing. The model,
however, did not take into account the fact that pay cable entrepreneurs would have to use
some of this money for expenditures besides programing. Id. at 37-39. Moreover, the
court was unconvinced that pay cable's use of the films would cause any harm greater
than a slightly later airing on broadcast television. Id. at 39. The circuit court doubted that
prevention of this slight delay could be considered a substantial government interest. Id.
at 50. Finally, Judge Weigel, in his concurrence, argued that the Commission was not
empowered by Congress to assert any interest justifying this form of censorship. Id. at 61
(Weigel, J., concurring).
101. Id. at 50. The court found the present rules overbroad. Under the film restrictions,
a motion picture over three years old could not be shown over a pay channel even though
the film might be entirely unsuitable for broadcast television. Similarly, the sports rules
would forbid pay cable from carrying games even if they had been dropped from regular
broadcast schedules. See id. at 51.
102. Id. at 50. The court observed that, although the pay cable rules contained a waiver
provision, it took the FCC six and one half months to process Home Box Office's waiver
petition. Id. at 51.
103. See id. at 50.
104. Id. at 51.
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the programing to which it is entitled. Alternatively, the Commission
could attempt to tailor the pay cable regulations more closely to its policy
objectives, but this method would call for the kind of content evaluation
the FCC has previously shunned. Moreover, whatever difficulties such
sensitive restraints encounter in the abstract are magnified when viewed
in real life. Television is one of the most dynamic and competitive
industries in the country. The networks continually experiment with
programs and program formats. It is doubtful whether any permanent
standards could be employed in this mercurial situation.
While Home Box Office may raise an insurmountable barrier to the
narrow area of pay cable regulation, the case also suggests new limits
and refinements on the Commission's overall cable authority. In Mid-
west Video, the Supreme Court plurality reached its conclusion by apply-
ing the "reasonably ancillary" standard of Southwestern Cable. The
District of Columbia Circuit, however, seemed to view the two cases as
distinct formulations of cable authority. The Home Box Office court
decided that the "reasonably ancillary" test is only relevant when cable
practices threaten the very existence of broadcasting. When the danger
is not so grave, this court would use the Midwest Video concept of
"long-established regulatory goals" as a separate test of authority. The
District of Columbia Circuit, however, carefully circumscribed that
holding, recognizing no valid policy goals other than those actually
approved in Midwest Video. Thus, it may be that the outer limits of cable
authority have been reached.
James Stewart
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